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THE CONSTITUTION
COMMANDETH: THOU SHALT NOT
PROTECT THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER
UNDER DESIGN PATENT AND TRADE
DRESS LAWS
1

BY KENNETH B. GERMAIN* AND LOUIS H. SITLER**

For many years and still currently, it has been assumed—and even
expressly asserted—that it is perfectly permissible to “stack” various legal
theories (concurrently or consecutively) to protect nonfunctional “designs” for
products. This is despite infrequent but cogent arguments that the available
theories, notably design patents and product design trade dress—both of which
are based upon federal statutes—are not Constitutionally compatible due to at
least the concept of Superfluity. The authors of this article carefully examine
the origin, nature, and meaning of these two types of IP protections in the
context of their two Constitutional bases—the Patent/Copyright Clause and
the Commerce Clause—and conclude that, indeed, “stacked” protections are
not Constitutionally permissible; the authors then recommend a workable
solution which they dub, the “Kewanee Kompromise.”
1. Copyright © 2021 Kenneth B. Germain and Louis H. Sitler. All Rights Reserved. The views
expressed in this article are those of its authors, and not necessarily views of their employer (Wood,
Herron & Evans, LLP, of Cincinnati, Ohio).
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4-5, 1999); “The Interface and Conflict Between Utility Patents, Design Patents and Copyrights, On the
One Hand, and Trademark/Trade Dress Rights, on the Other Hand,” Advanced Seminar on Trademark
Law sponsored by Practicing Law Institute (New York, NY; June 30, 2005); “Hapless Halloween: The
Slaying of ‘Son of TrafFix’ (aka Considering the Constitutionality of Combining Product Design Trade
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Preface - by Kenneth B. Germain

About a decade ago, my expertise as a potential testimonial expert
witness was engaged in connection with Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v.
American Specialties, Inc. 2 After careful study and analysis, I submitted
three Expert Reports, one each regarding (1) Aesthetic Functionality, (2)
Likelihood of Confusion, and (3) Unconstitutionality of Trade Dress
Protection for Expired Design Patents. My conclusions on these three topics
were as follows: (1) The “Convex Arc” design common to all of Plaintiff’s
trade dress claims—based in part on “incontestable” trademark
registrations—was unprotectable because this design was “functional”, not
in a mechanical/useful way, but because it was “aesthetically functional” in
that it “serves as an attractive, upscale, design that competitors (including
Defendant) should be allowed to approximate —even to ‘copy’—so that
commercial buyers will have access to multiple sources of this attractive,
upscale design.” (2) Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s design actually
was protectable, I concluded that, applying the relevant (Sleekcraft)
factors—as much as possible based on the then-incomplete factual record—
there was no sufficient and satisfactory basis on which to find “likelihood of
confusion” actionable under the Lanham Act. (3) Continuing to assume,
again arguendo, that Plaintiff’s design actually was protectable and also that
Plaintiff could establish likelihood of confusion with Defendant’s (very
similar) design, I concluded as follows:
The act of acquiring the design patents on the Convex Arc effectively and
permanently precluded protection of the covered feature(s) under federal
trade dress law (including Lanham Act § 32, for registered marks, and §
43(a), for unregistered marks) and/or under any/all state law doctrines.
This results from the preemptive effects of the Patent/Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Because (1) and (2) are not relevant to this article, only (3) will be discussed
now. As I recall, both parties were major players in the restroom accessory
design/manufacturing business, specifically including such devices as
stainless-steel paper towel dispensers and sanitary napkins disposal
receptacles. Plaintiff (Bobrick) had obtained more than 15 design patents—
among them U.S. Des. Pat. No. 332,894 and U.S. Des. Pat. No. 342,175,
displayed below next to each respective verbal claim. These two design
patents (plus the others for the same design, for similar products) had run
their course (then 14 years) and expired.

2. No. CV 10-6938-SVW (PLAx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147813 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010).

2022

THE CONSTITUTION COMMANDETH

91

However, their owner, Bobrick, also obtained a trademark registration, U.S.
Trademark Reg. No. 2, 951,014, for this line of products, shown below next
to the Identification of Goods:

And this registration had, in time, attained “incontestable” status per the
Lanham Act. 3 This registration—plus parallel common law principles—
provided the basis for the Bobrick v. ASI lawsuit. (By the way, Bobrick’s
line of “Convex Arc” products was marketed under the word mark
CONTURA, whereas, ASI’s very similarly-designed and directly-competing
products were marketed as ROVAL).
The case was decided in favor of Defendant (ASI) on a totally separate
basis, namely, utilitarian functionality. 4 Thus, none of my three raised-and3. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
4. Cf. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v. Am. Specialties, Inc., No. CV 10-6938 SVW (PLA), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111465 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012). This opinion contained a comprehensive albeit
somewhat unconvincing analysis of the utilitarian functionality defense that actually won the
day. Ostensibly following TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001), but
really relying upon the earlier (and thus somewhat less authoritative) Disc Golf Ass’n v. Champion Discs,
Inc., 158 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1998) case, the Bobrick court expressly considered four relevant factors
(including “alternative designs”). Bobrick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111465 at *18. Notably, the judge
stated that a design could be deemed functional as long as “some utilitarian advantage” could be
identified. Id. at *19; see also id. at *22. This broad standard gave an immediate benefit to
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resolved issues was mentioned by the court. Relevant to the current article,
my unconstitutionality thesis was not probed at all.
But, query, what would have happened if the court had avoided
utilitarian functionality, and then disagreed with my aesthetic functionality
and likelihood of confusion conclusions? In that scenario—not one that I’d
consider outside the realm of possibility—how would the court have handled
my back-up unconstitutionality thesis? Admittedly, the District Court might
have elected to elude this last-ditch argument and, even if it “needed” to deal
with it, sought every possible way to avoid making groundbreaking law on
such an unchartered basis! But that does not resolve an issue that could be
critical to another case…
Fast forward about ten years with me now working in tandem with Lou
Sitler (one of my former trademark law students and now an associate at the
same firm). With the passage of time, surprisingly, the protectionist
environment in the IP practice field has not changed at all, as it remains
common to stack types of protection for non-functional product features
(designs, configurations, color-combinations, etc.). Indeed, it remains
common for veteran, high-profile practitioners to openly tout the availability
and favorability of using more than one type of IP for the same product
design—consecutively and/or concurrently. 5 The written materials for the
cited webinar—probably provided to me by one of the authors (two of whom
are decades-old friends and respected colleagues of mine)—unabashedly
impliedly and sometimes expressly assume that there is absolutely no reason
why more than one of these three IP protections cannot be used for the very
same “design.” A few specifics:
Mr. Litowitz relies on the age-old success of Coca Cola in first getting
a design patent on its classic little-bottle shape, followed by later getting a
Defendant. Next, the court weighed the effect of a few advertising claims made by Plaintiff early-on;
these claims stated that the new “convex arc” design was “stronger and stiffer” and “more impactresistant” than pre-existing designs. Id. at *21-22; see also id. at *28-29. The judge viewed these bits of
advertising copy as proof that Plaintiff had “touted” functional characteristics of its new design. But the
judge was unmoved by direct testimony from Plaintiff’s VP of Marketing candidly admitting that Plaintiff
really had had no factual basis for these claims and, indeed, removed them from its advertising soon after
it learned that they were not validated by testing. See id. at *29-30. Further, the judge discounted expert
testimony that any augmentations of strength and/or durability needed to be put into perspective by
considering particular angles, etc., of stress. Id. at *22. Not to be overlooked, in a brief Order, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, stating:
The district court…properly identified and evaluated the factors enumerated in Disc Golf Ass’n
v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998), and concluded that both
Bobrick’s registered trademark and alleged unregistered trade dress were functional. These
factual findings of functionality were supported by ample evidence, including expert testimony
presented by ASI and an advertisement from Bobrick documenting the functionality of the
product. The district court correctly viewed the Bobrick product design as a whole, and did not
base its determination merely on the conclusion that the component parts of the Contura Series
were functional. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v. Am. Specialties, Inc., 565 Fed. Appx. 660,
661 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., Robert Litowitz, Meredith Wilkes & Roberta Jacobs-Meadway, Trade Dress, Design
Patent, and Copyright: Strategies to Maximize Protection, Challenge and Defeat Infringement Strafford
(Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/AR3F-DZ4X.
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trademark registration for the same (or highly similar) shape. 6 He also
positively references Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Dolgencorp LLC, 7 one of a few
modern appellate cases that seems to be comfortable with double
protection. 8
Ms. Jacobs-Meadway, whose slide set is entitled “Copyright Law as an
Alternative” (doubtlessly in relation to other protections for non-functional
designs), includes phrases such as “Nothing precludes claims for
trademark/trade dress”, “Jewelry designs are subject to copyright protection
as well as trade dress protection . . .”, and “Furniture designs may be subject
to copyright as well as trade dress and design patent rights.” 9
And it’s not like these commentators are outliers of any type!
It continues to amaze me that so few—maybe none at all—recent cases
mention, let alone decide, whether the overall Constitution-based IP scheme
prohibits the duplicate (possibly triplicate) protections so blithely
recommended by leading lawyers such as Litowitz, Wilkes, and JacobsMeadway. And this, despite my numerous public protestations to the
contrary for decades! 10
The instant article grapples with this conundrum, explicating and
examining the caselaw (which largely, but not entirely, supports the views
Lou and I now eschew), exploring the carefully calibrated views of
academics (largely siding with our views), and practitioners (whose views
usually just “assume” overlapping is acceptable). It recommends a
resolution (overlap not permitted) and a solution (the so-called Kewanee
Kompromise); it also posits why the practicing bar has not taken up this
defense-oriented challenge in litigation.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at slide 14.
958 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Litowitz, Wilkes & Jacobs-Meadway, supra note 5 at slide 45.
Id. at slides 71, 78, and 79.
See Germain, supra note *.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The founders of this country, over two hundred years ago, recognized
that invention is necessary to make America a strong economic power. 11
Accordingly, the founders granted Congress the power to enact patent and
copyright laws pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution. 12 From the beginning, the Supreme Court recognized this
Clause as creating a right to copy. This Clause, which is often referred to as
the “Patent and Copyright Clause”, 13 recites:
The Congress shall have power… To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.] 14

The two phrases in the Patent Clause that create the right to copy are, “to
promote the progress” and “for limited times.” The right to copy promotes
progress by allowing the public to build on the inventions in expired patents
and stimulate new invention. 15 It is self-evident why the right to copy
follows from the constitutional mandate that patent rights be for limited
times: if the right to copy never returned, the patent monopoly would not be
limited in time. 16
When asked to balance the concerns of patent law against those of
unfair competition law with respect to the copying of product designs, the
Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly over the years that the right to copy must
prevail. 17 The Court established the policies of patent law in a series of
decisions analyzing the conflict between the federal patent laws and state
11. Both Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson were noted inventors themselves. Jefferson was
a moving force behind the Convention’s recognition of the importance of encouraging invention, and was
the author of the 1793 Patent Act. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966).
12. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964).
13. For purposes of brevity, the Patent and Copyright Clause will be referred to herein as the “Patent
Clause.” The authors note that dubbing this clause “the Intellectual Property Clause” (or, for short, “the
IP clause”) is misleading. There is no doubt that this Clause only embraces patents and copyrights; such
other types of “intellectual property” as trade secrets and trademarks certainly are not included. Thus,
other authors who employ “IP Clause” references are misspeaking. See Theodore H. Davis Jr., Copying
in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 Minn L. Rev. 595,
605-06 (1996); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 Calif. L. Rev. 241, 265 (1998). One commentator, Professor Pollack, notes, and the authors agree,
that the terms Patent Clause or Intellectual Property Clause “both use[] words not in the text and
incorrectly implies the primacy of rights granted patent and copyright holders.” Malla Pollack, What Is
Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb. L. Rev., 755, n.1 (2001). Professor
Pollack concludes that the best name for the Clause is the “Progress Clause.” Id.
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (In re Bergy points out that this is really two clauses in one: the
Copyright Clause and the Patent Clause. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974).
16. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255
(1945); August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 480–81.
17. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167-68; Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 235, 238 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-22
(1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
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laws. In deciding these early cases, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the
public rights guaranteed by the patent laws. 18 These decisions discuss
whether the patent laws conflict with and therefore “preempt” state laws
under the Supremacy Clause. 19 Specifically, the Court found a public right
in the subject matter of expired patents and focused its analyses on whether
or not the common law doctrine in question usurped this public right. 20
II. THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO COPY
In as early as 1896, in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., the Supreme
Court set the foundation for the concept that, in return for granting a patent,
the public receives the right to copy the patented invention upon the
expiration of the patent term. 21 In this case, the Court permitted copying of
SINGER sewing machines’ mechanical features after their patents had
expired. 22 The Singer company owned a portfolio of utility patents for its
SINGER sewing machines, which represented a general product line of
sewing machines. The Court recognized that, by having patents and thus a
monopoly for the SINGER machine, “none of the machines as a whole were
open to public competition.” 23 The Court further recognized that this
monopoly was only for specific durations, stating, “[w]hen these patents
expired every one had an equal right to make and vend such machines.” 24
18. Otherwise referred to as the right to copy doctrine or the public bargain doctrine. Id.
19. Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, often referred to as the “Supremacy Clause,” provides
that ”[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. Robert G. Bone, In Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. Leg. Analysis 183, 185-186
(2015). Professor Bone introduced and advocated the unusual idea that there is no “right to copy” per se,
but merely a strong pro-copying policy that must be weighed along with other factors:
Section 5 … focuses on the right to copy product features not protected by patent or copyright,
and argues that this right is in fact no right at all, but rather a policy to be balanced with others
in the social welfare calculus. This policy has value because it promotes competition in the
product market, facilitates downstream innovation, and channels patentable inventions to the
patent system. It follows that the social benefits of allowing free copying of product features
should depend on the extent to which copying promotes these three goals, and it also follows
that those benefits must be balanced against the costs of denying trademark protection measured
in terms of consumer confusion and resulting harm. Id.
He explains his thesis in detail, id. at 218-21, reaching this conclusion:
[T]he so-called right to copy should not be treated as a utility-constraining right capable of
cutting off trademark protection by its own force. It makes sense only as a statement of policy,
and as a policy it must be balanced against the Lanham Act’s policy of preventing consumer
confusion. Id. at 221 (footnote omitted).
Aside from running totally counter to the long-held views of the senior author of the current article—to
the effect that “the rule” is free and open competition (provided that it is fair), with specific “exceptions”
being limited to carefully-drawn and usually narrowly interpreted, mostly legislation-based protections—
it is worth noting that an examination of scholarly articles in the roughly five years since publication of
the Bone article, no adherents to his view have appeared.
21. See Singer, 163 U.S. at 185-86.
22. Id. at 185-202.
23. Id. at 179.
24. Id. at 189.
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The Court explained: “[i]t is self evident that on the expiration of a patent
the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing
formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this
condition that the patent is granted.” 25 Thus, in holding that the newcomer
had a right to copy SINGER sewing machines, the Court’s attitude towards
monopolies created by the Patent Clause was that, upon termination of the
monopoly, the public has a right to copy that which had been protected by
the monopoly (i.e., by the patent), and any means by which this right is
disregarded as improper. This holding set the stage for the public bargain
doctrine.
Four decades later, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. 26 Applying the law of unfair competition,
the Court held that it was not unfair competition for Kellogg Co. to copy
National Biscuit Co.’s pillow-shaped shredded wheat biscuit after
invalidation of the design patent for the biscuit shape and expiration of the
utility patents for the machines that make it. 27 More particularly, the Court
stated, “a design patent was taken out to cover the pillow-shaped form,” and
“upon expiration of the patents the form, as well as the name, was dedicated
to the public.” 28 The Kellogg Court reinforced the right to copy precedent
of Singer, stating:
Where an article may be manufactured by all, a particular manufacturer
can no more assert exclusive rights in a form in which the public has
become accustomed to see the article and which, in the minds of the
public, is primarily associated with the article rather than a particular
producer, than it can in the case of a name with similar connections in the
public mind. 29

Again, it remains clear that the Supreme Court interpreted the “Patent
Clause” as providing the public with an inherent right to copy that which had
been suspended by the patent monopoly, and that any means used by the
original patent holder to assert exclusive rights over the product beyond the
expiration of the monopoly would be improper. In this regard, the Patent
Clause may mandate the public bargain, being the “quid pro quo
25. The Court further explained, with respect to the trademark:
It follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public
the right to make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent. . . . To
say otherwise would be to hold that although the public had acquired the device covered by the
patent, yet the owner of the patent or the manufacturer of the patented thing had retained the
designated name which was essentially necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of
that which had become theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly. In other words, that the
patentee or manufacturer could take the benefit and advantage of the patent upon the condition
that at its termination the monopoly should cease, and yet when the end was reached disregard
the public dedication and practically perpetuate indefinitely an exclusive right.
Id. at 185-86.
26. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
27. See id. at 119-22 (Kellogg had made reasonable efforts to distinguish its product by using a
different carton, label, company name, and biscuit size).
28. Id. at 119-20.
29. Id. at 120.
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arrangement,” in itself because dedication of patented inventions to the
public domain is an important way that the patent law “promote[s] the
progress of … useful Arts.” 30
Perhaps the strongest statement of the public bargain doctrine can be
found in the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg.
Co.:
By the force of the patent laws not only is the invention of a patent
dedicated to the public upon its expiration, but the public thereby becomes
entitled to share in the good will which the patentee has built up in the
patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent monopoly.
Hence we have held that the patentee may not exclude the public from
participating in that good will or secure, to any extent, a continuation of
his monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and registering as a
trademark any particular descriptive matter appearing in the
specifications, drawings or claims of the expired patent, whether or not
such matter describes essential elements of the invention or claims. 31

In this case, the defendant was charged with infringing a patent that it
had assigned to the plaintiff. 32 The issue was whether the assignor was
estopped, by virtue of his assignment of his rights to the patent, from arguing
that the expired patent covered his allegedly infringing device.33 The Court
found that the assignor was not estopped, reasoning that application of the
doctrine of estoppel under these circumstances would be inconsistent with
the public bargain rule that the subject matter of expired patents is dedicated
to the public. 34 In so holding, the Court decreed:
The public has invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly to the
patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted reservation or
continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the patent
monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed,
runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws. 35

Thus, once the subject of an expired patent has entered the public domain,
the rights in it cannot be subject to private barter, sale, or waiver. 36
30. Kevin E. Mohr, At the Interface of Patent and Trademark Law: Should a Product Configuration
Disclosed in a Utility Patent Ever Qualify for Trade Dress Protection, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
339, 348 (1996), explaining that:
The Patent Clause and statutes passed pursuant to it were intended to create a bargain between
society and the inventor, a straightforward quid pro quo arrangement in which the government
would grant to inventors a limited-duration monopoly allowing them to exploit their inventions
without fear of competition. In return, the inventor was obliged to disclose to the public
precisely how the invention worked, so that others could improve upon it and make further
advances in the relevant technology. Thus, the inventor’s disclosure was to be the consideration
that would support the government’s grant of patent rights; only if properly disclosed would
the invention be available for use, thus allowing society to benefit from its bargain. Further,
once the patent term expired, the invention would enter the public domain and become available
for the public to use and copy freely. Id.
31. 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 251.
33. Id. at 250.
34. Id. at 257-58.
35. Id. at 256.
36. The successful Petitioners in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. explain this
concept in their brief:
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Another indication of the Supreme Court’s concern regarding patentbased monopolies was evidenced by Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v
University of Illinois Foundation. 37 In this case, the Court held that an
alleged patent infringer can use res judicata and collateral estoppel to
foreclose an infringement suit where the patent claim in question had already
been declared invalid in an earlier, albeit unrelated lawsuit. 38 In so holding,
the Court stated, so long as “a patentee has had a full and fair chance to
litigate the validity of his patent in an earlier case,” a plea of estoppel may
later be raised to defend “a charge of infringement of a patent that has once
been declared invalid.” 39 Significantly, this defense may be raised by any
accused infringer and there is no requirement that the accused infringer be
involved in the previous litigation.
As a result of the holding in Blonder-Tongue, reinforcing the Court’s
continuing concern regarding patent-based monopolies, 40 it is apparent that
the Court recognized that patent litigation is an important public tool that has
the potential to minimize monopolies and open markets, benefitting not just
the prevailing party in a given suit, but also benefitting competitors and
consumers throughout the economy. Specifically, “[t]his view is deeply
intuitive and has been the basis for a number of judicial and legislative
enactments to increase the number of patent challenges brought to
fruition.” 41 Moreover:
By 1971, the Court had consciously recognized a line of decisions aimed
at “encouraging authoritative testing of patent validity,” and, in more
recent years, has continued to root decisions in the ‘strong public interest’
found in the adjudication of patent rights. Following this doctrine, a
number of courts have refused to enforce—and declared federally
preempted—otherwise-valid contracts that might impair a party’s
incentives or ability to bring a patent challenge. 42
Those decisions [Singer, Kellogg, and Scott Paper] shaped the common law that Congress
sought to codify in the Lanham Act and, in particular, defined the outer limit of that law in the
case of patented inventions. In codifying that law, the presumption is that Congress sought to
bring the Singer rule with it.
Brief for Petitioner at 28, TafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1255 (2001) (No.
99-1571), 2000 WL 35796342, at 28.
37. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
38. See id. at 350.
39. Id. at 333, 350.
40. But see infra note 88 (noting that some patent practitioners and academics do not view a patent
as creating a monopoly; rather, they argue that patents merely provide the owner with negative rights).
See e.g., Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321 (2009);
see also What Rights Will a Patent Give to Me?, RICHARDS PATENT LAW (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://perma.cc/UKH5-283P. However, many sources use the term “monopoly” without reservation. See
e.g., Moshe H. Bonder, Patent & Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or Providing an
Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2004).
41. Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943,
1946 (2016).
42. Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674-75 (1969); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d 1,
6 (6th Cir. 1974); Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 230-32 (7th Cir.
1972); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advert. Co., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir.

2022

THE CONSTITUTION COMMANDETH

99

Although decided before Blonder-Tongue, the case of Lear v. Adkins 43
is illustrative in this regard. The issue in front of the Court in Lear was
whether patent licensees are permitted to challenge the validity of an
underlying patent, specifically in a suit for unpaid royalty payments. 44 The
Court held that patent licensees are permitted to challenge the validity of the
underlying patent. 45 In its opinion the Court explained that, “we granted
certiorari in the present case… to reconsider the validity of the … rule in the
light of our recent decisions emphasizing the strong federal policy favoring
free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.” 46 The Court
elucidated its holding by stating, “[t]he national policy expressed in the
patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly,
cannot be frustrated by private agreements among individuals, with or
without the approval of the State.” 47
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION LINE OF CASES
Most of the above-discussed cases set forth a federal policy of freedom
to use product features that had been restricted only by the limited monopoly
deemed necessary to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”
These policy standpoints further align with the landmark cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 48 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 49 wherein the Supreme Court held that certain state unfair competition
laws were preempted by federal law. In doing so, the Court confirmed the
principle that a state may not prohibit copying something that the federal
government had left in the public domain, freely to be copied by all, thereby
reaffirming the right to copy doctrine.
In Sears, the senior party had obtained design and utility patents on a
“pole lamp—a vertical tube having lamp fixtures along the outside, the tube
being made so that it will stand upright between the floor and ceiling of a
room.” 50 Subsequently, the junior party sold a “pole lamp” virtually
identical to the one produced by the senior party, at a substantially lower
price. 51 The senior party then brought suit claiming, first, that the junior
1971). See also Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1947) (holding
that a party is not estopped from challenging a patent’s validity despite a contractual covenant to refrain
from doing so); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Tech. Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 62 (7th Cir. 1970), abrogated
by Act of Aug. 27, 1982 § 17, Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317, 322 (refusing to enforce an arbitration
provision for a patent validity claim)).
43. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
44. Id. at 655-56.
45. Id. at 676.
46. Id. at 656 (citing Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)).
47. Id. at 677.
48. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
49. Id. at 234 (1964).
50. Id. at 225-26 (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id. at 226.
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party had infringed the senior party’s patents and, second, that by selling the
pole lamps, Sears had created confusion about the source of the lamps and
thus had engaged in unfair competition under Illinois law. 52 Reversing the
Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Illinois’ unfair competition law
was incompatible with federal patent law, and therefore unconstitutional. 53
In so holding, the Court explained:
An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is
in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do
so. What Sears did was to copy Stiffel’s design and to sell lamps almost
identical to those sold by Stiffel. This it had every right to do under the
federal patent laws… Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested…
[W]hile federal law grants only 14 or 17 years’ protection to genuine
inventions… States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking
in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards.
This would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to
be tolerated. 54

While the “pole lamp” in Sears was found to be an “unpatentable
article” 55 (i.e., one not meeting the requirements for patentability), the Court
made clear that, for any article deserving and acquiring patent protection,
“when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the
right to make the article—including the right to make it in precisely the shape
it carried when patented—passes to the public.” 56
The Court further stated that the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits states from “extend[ing] the life of a patent beyond its
expiration date or giv[ing] a patent on an article which lacked the level of
invention required for federal patents.” 57 The Court found that to do so
“would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true
inventions, and then only for a limited time.” 58 The Court emphasized that
“[j]ust as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it
cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition,
give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws.” 59
The second case, Compco, involved a similar set of facts as in Sears.
The article at issue in Compco, a light reflector, previously had been
protected by a design patent held by the senior party. 60 The junior party had
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 226. The District Court held that the allegedly infringed patents were invalid. Id.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 231-32 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 230 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 231.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The District Court held that the design patent was invalid. Id. at 235.
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been held liable for unfair competition under Illinois law for having copied
the light reflector. 61 The Supreme Court took a step further and opined that
the unconstitutionality of the state law does not result only from its conflict
with federal patent policy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 62 but also due
to its collision with the limitations set forth in the Patent Clause itself, which
provides for time-limited property rights on novel intangible subject
matter. 63
The Supreme Court is not alone in concluding that the time-limited
property rights guaranteed by the Patent Clause cannot be overridden by state
laws. Scholars also have commented on such conflicts with the absolute time
limits for patents as established by Congress and commanded by the Patent
Clause. 64 As explained by a noted design patent specialist, Perry Saidman:
[T]he subject matter of an expired patent enters the public domain, and the
public has a right to copy it. Any attempt to claim…protection in the same
subject matter is void as against public policy. This respects the bargain
between the inventor, beneficiary of a 14 or 20 year monopoly on the
design or invention, and the public. When the patent monopoly is over,
it’s over, and no other law, state or federal, can be used to extract that
subject matter from the public domain. 65

During the next two decades, the Supreme Court may have seemed to
move away from the strict views it had embraced in Sears and Compco. 66
However, in 1989, the Court returned to the basic rationale
of Sears and Compco in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 67 In
that case, the Court revisited and reaffirmed the basic principle that “after
the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to

61. Id. at 234-35.
62. See supra note 6.
63. Id. at 237-38.
64. See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond A Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp., 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 259, 274 (1995), explaining that:
Seemingly, if a separate constitutional phrase (1) includes a limit by negative implication, and
(2) this limit has not been interpreted out of the clause, Congress cannot by pass the limit
through the Commerce Clause. As discussed immediately below, the “limited times” provision
in the Intellectual Property Clause fills these requirements.
See also Anthony E. Dowell, Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the Progress of Science
and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 137, 168 (1994), explaining that:
[T]he Patent Clause limits Congress’s power to grant monopolies. Congress may grant
monopolies only for a limited time…the right to copy unpatented inventions is rooted in the
Patent Clause. Accordingly, the federal trademark and unfair competition law may conflict with
not only the coequal patent laws but also the Constitution.
65. Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats? or Beyond Functionality:
Design Patents are the Key to Unlocking the Trade Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc’y 839 (2000).
66. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (analyzing the preemptive effects of the
federal copyright laws and upholding a state law prohibiting sound recordings); see also Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974) (finding no preemption of state trade secret law by patent
law).
67. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.” 68 The Court again
addressed a state’s interference in the field of patent law, and struck down a
state statute prohibiting the use of a direct-molding process to closely copy
unpatented boat hulls. The Court’s decision is consistent with the
Sears/Compco doctrine and reaffirmed the public’s right to copy.
In Bonito Boats, the senior party developed a hull design for a fiberglass
recreational boat which was very favorably received by the boating
market. 69 However, that party never filed a patent application to protect
its design under federal patent laws. The junior party allegedly used the
senior party’s hull, which was publicly available, in a direct molding process
to duplicate its design and then sell the duplicates. The senior party sued the
junior party pursuant to the state ”plug molding” statute which made it
“unlawful to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of
sale any manufactured vessel.” 70 The critical issue for the Supreme Court
was whether the federal patent statute preempted the state ”plug molding”
statute. 71
The Court held that the state statute was preempted, explaining that “the
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies
into the public domain.” 72 Thus, state law protection for techniques and
designs that are already disclosed in the marketplace may conflict with the
very purpose of patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas and depriving
society of “the building blocks of further innovation.” 73 Moreover, “state
regulation of intellectual property,” the Court noted, “must yield to the extent
that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws.” 74 Once “the public has paid the congressionally mandated price for
disclosure” of the invention, “the States may not render the exchange
fruitless by offering patent-like protection to the subject matter of the expired
patent.” 75 Once the patent monopoly has expired, “the thing formerly
covered by the patent becomes public property.” 76 And significantly, if a
publicly known design or utilitarian idea is unprotected by a patent, the
subject is in the same position as an expired patent. 77 Such protection by
the state would seriously interfere with the federal ”patent statute’s careful

68. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152 (citing Kellogg and Singer). The Bonito Boats Court added:
“For almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal patent
laws do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use.’” Id. at 165.
69. Id. at 144.
70. Id. at 144-45.
71. Id. at 153.
72. Id. at 151.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 152.
75. Id.
76. Id. (internal citation omitted).
77. Id.
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balance between public right and private monopoly to promote certain
creative activity.” 78
The Court observed that trade dress (i.e., product configuration) was a
potential type of protection that fell within the subject matter of design
patents. 79 While the Court made this connection, it stopped short of saying
that the broader doctrine of trademark protection can never be extended to
patentable subject matter; it also did not state that full trademark protection
should be afforded to patentable subject matter. The Court merely stated that
“limited regulations” and/or “some conditions” can be placed on the use of
patentable designs “in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.” 80
Further, the Court explained that “we have consistently reiterated the
teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed before the public
without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without
significant restraint.” 81
Indeed, other language in Bonito Boats suggests that there are strict and
narrow bounds to the restrictions that can be legally placed on the use of
patentable subject matter. 82 For example, the Court identified, as a matter of
federal policy, a “federal right to ‘copy and use’” the subject matter of an
expired patent. 83 Further, the Court indicated that a law that protects an
unpatented product from copying undermines the entire patent system:
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an
unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely
disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the
ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of
federal patent policy. 84

Although this language expressly refers to state law, the reasoning of
the Court—including the underlying principle that publicly-known ideas
“are the tools of creation available to all” would appear to be equally
applicable to any federal law that “substantially interferes” with the use of a
utilitarian or design concept disclosed through a patent. 85 The Court
78. Id. at 167.
79. Id. at 154.
80. Id. at 154, 165.
81. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
82. As properly presented by the successful Petitioners in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc.:
[E]specially when a product is the subject of an expired patent, a legislature may not “prohibit
the copying of the article itself.” That would result in the sort of perpetual patent monopoly the
Framers expressly sought to preclude. In Bonito Boats, the Court reaffirmed this principle when
it observed that the statute at issue there, “[i]n essence, *** prohibit[ed] the entire public from
engaging in a form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain.” That result
impermissibly “restrict[ed] the public’s ability to exploit” a product configuration within the
public domain. (internal citations omitted). U.S. Pet. Brief, supra note 36, at 34-35.
83. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 165.
84. Id. at 156-57.
85. Id. at 156. The authors recognize and fully acknowledge that the Sears and Compco decisions
dealt with a state law vs. federal law conflict, and that states could not, because of the Supremacy Clause,
create their own patent or patent-like laws. In this regard, this Supremacy Clause line of cases, albeit
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concluded that Sears had correctly found “that States may not offer patentlike protection to intellectual creations.”86 If the states were allowed to create
patent-like rights, they would disrupt the balance that Congress had created
and adhered to for over 200 years in the field of patent law.
In view of the Supreme Court cases discussed above, it is crystal clear
that patents grant limited monopolies and the public has a right to copy that
can only be temporarily denied. In this regard, the Court has consistently
concluded that when patent rights end, the public has the right to copy what
was previously protected by the patent. To this end, the public, including
any competitors, has full right to copy and use, if done without causing undue
risk of unfair competition in the form of likely confusion. As discussed
below in section V of this article, Congress has similarly guarded against the
stifling effects of permitting perpetual monopolies.
IV. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF DESIGN PATENTS
The original purpose of patent law was to protect the public from
unwarranted monopolies. 87 The framers of the Constitution, knowing the
importance of balancing free competition and government-sponsored
monopoly, empowered Congress to grant monopolies, but only “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” and then only for
“limited times.” 88 Thus, the Patent Clause is both a power granted to and a
limitation on Congress.
Under this framework, the standards of patentability are designed to
ensure that society benefits from the grant of a patent. In this regard,
Congress may not grant patent rights to inventions or designs that do not
relevant to the issue, does not dispose of the federal law vs. federal law conflict probed in further detail
below in section VII of this paper. Here is a brief and cogent introduction per the Petitioners in TrafFix:
Congress is no more free to use trademark law as a means of extending the patent monopoly than are the
States. The Lanham Act is a product of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, not its patent power.
While potent, the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to override the express limits in other
parts of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1, 196 (1824) (Commerce Clause “power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution.”) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis added); North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704-705
(1946) (Commerce Clause power “is limited by express provisions in other parts of the Constitution”).
Thus, in establishing trade dress protection under Section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act], the Commerce
Clause does not empower Congress to establish what are, in essence, patent monopolies of unlimited
times. U.S. Pet. Brief, supra note 36, at 35.
86. Id. at 156.
87. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
88. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The authors note and acknowledge that some patent practitioners
and academics do not view a patent as creating a monopoly - a concept that a person can patent an idea
and have complete ownership of the idea for a limited time. See supra note 40. Rather, patents provide
the owner with negative rights. In this regard, a patent provides its owner with the right to prevent others
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale, the same invention. With this understanding, many
operate under the misconception that getting a patent is equal to owning and controlling the market of its
sale. However, without a market and customers, a patent can never create a monopoly. While this view
is plausible, with a market and customers, a patent can certainly be used to facilitate a monopoly.
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meet specific standards of patentability. In order for society to benefit from
a design or functional invention, it must be a new, useful, and nonobvious
innovation. 89 An invention or design that is not new is already in the public
domain and not susceptible to private monopoly. The novelty and
nonobviousness requirements are necessary, according to Thomas Jefferson,
for “drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.” 90
While design patents and utility patents both find their origins in the
“Patent Clause,” historically, the “substantive requirements for design
patents were separate and distinct from their utility patent counterparts.”91
In this regard, the early Patent Office commissioners had an enormous
impact on the development of the patent law and its practice, especially as it
related to design patents. 92 The merger of design and utility patent standards
to define the current era of design patent rules began in the Act of 1842. 93
The 1902 Act rang in the era of inventiveness and nonobviousness, which
has lasted until the present. 94 In this regard, the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements now are applied to both design and utility patent regimes. 95
The last major revision to the design patent laws occurred as part of the
larger Patent Act of 1952. 96 Under that statute, a design patent was granted
to “[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture.” 97 Additionally, this section incorporated a more restrictive
version of the catchall section, which provided: “The provisions of this title
relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as
otherwise provided.” 98 Most importantly, the 1952 Act also codified the

89. See 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-03 (Current through Public Law 117-39, approved August 31, 2021)
90. Graham, 383 U.S. at 1, 9.
91. See Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent
Standard, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 531, 538 (2010) (explaining that it “was the compartmentalization of these
two regimes that kept the widespread rubric of invention in utility patents from spreading to designs.”).
92. See id. at 537.
93. See id. at 539-45.
94. See id. at 589-95.
95. Compared to utility patents, a determination of whether a design is obvious over the prior art
can be challenging. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Gamon Plus, Inc., 939 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(reversing the Board’s determination of obviousness based on the primary reference, but affirming
obviousness based on a secondary reference).
96. On Sept. 16, 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was passed by Congress, Pub.
L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), which made minor revisions to the design patent laws. One notable
change to design patents that resulted from the AIA was that the term of a design patent was increased to
15 years (from 14 years).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
98. Id.
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nonobviousness requirement in § 103 99 as a condition to patentability for all
patents. 100
While Congress was working to resolve the confusion surrounding the
design patent laws through the legislation discussed above, the PTO and
courts continued to struggle with the issue of functionality in design—often
referred to as the doctrine of functionality. This doctrine stems from 35
U.S.C. § 171, which requires that, to be patentable as a design, a design must
be “ornamental.” 101 Thus, the common understanding is that a design which
is “functional” cannot be “ornamental.” 102 Judicial in origin, the doctrine of
functionality arises in both design patent validity and infringement
analyses. 103 Today, design patents are not granted for designs that are

99. 35 U.S.C. § 103 states:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed
invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be
negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
100. Framed as a condition to patentability by the Patent Act of 1952, rather than the rubric of
invention, it is now clear that the nonobviousness requirement applies to both utility and design patents.
See Du Mont, supra note 91, at 535.
101. As explained by one commentator, “[d]esign patents were a recognition by Congress ‘that the
useful arts would be stimulated by that which appeals to the eye, and that protection should be granted to
those who create a pleasing design’.” Wayne A. Kalkwarf, The Commerce Clause Versus the Patent and
Copyright Clause: A Battle of Constitutional Proportions, 54 IDEA 351, 384 (2014) (quoting Mark A.
LoBello, The Dichotomy Between Artistic Expression and Industrial Design: To Protect or Not to
Protect, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 107, 110 (1992)). Mr. Kalkwarf continued to explain that, “[t]he law
manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may
enhance its salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public.”
Id. at 385 (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S.511, 525 (1871)). Again, symbiosis is noted, plus
emphasis on the restriction of design patents to tangible products, which contrasts trade dress.
102. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1504.01(c), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE
(9th ed., rev. Aug. 2017).
103. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Design Patent Evolution: From Obscurity to Center Stage, 32
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 53, 65 (2015) (citing 35 U.S.C. §171(d) and Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)), explaining that:
A functionality test is not expressly embodied in the statutory requirement for obtaining design
patent protection. Nevertheless, a judicially developed functionality test or limitation provides
courts with a method of assessing whether the subject matter of a design patent satisfies the
ornamental requirement. The Supreme Court stated that ‘a design must present an aesthetically
pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone.’ The aesthetic appearance necessary
to satisfy the ornamental requirement is not limited to designs that have a certain degree of
beauty such as might be found in the fine arts. Such a test would be highly subjective.
Consequently it would be difficult to draw a line between what is and is not beautiful or within
the category of fine art. To avoid this difficulty, courts have utilized the more objective standard
of functionality.
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“dictated by function alone.” 104 This doctrine, however, did not fully
develop until the patent code began to resemble its modern form. 105
V. ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION
Throughout history, Congressional attitudes towards monopolies,
including monopolies created through the patent system, have been skeptical
at best. 106 While patent laws are some of the oldest and most fundamental
in our country, the Founders understood the threat of monopolies and
debated the concepts of patents and monopolies when drafting the
Constitution. For example, by the time he drafted the first patent act in
1793, Thomas Jefferson had come to tolerate limited monopolies on
inventions as a necessary evil to insure that “ingenuity should receive a
liberal encouragement.” 107 In this regard, the Constitution itself directly
empowers Congress to pass a patent statute, and it further provides Congress
with the authority to create the patent system to thereby minimize the
potential for monopolies by limiting the duration of time in which a patent
owner can enforce a patent against a competitor. 108 While Congress has
always been skeptical towards monopolies, Congress didn’t act on this
concern until after the Supreme Court’s holding in Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co. 109 In this case, the Court reprimanded litigants
who had obtained patents ”principally to forestall competition, rather than to
obtain the just rewards of an inventor.” 110 Witnessing this and the potential
for negative effects on free trade and commerce, Congress enacted the

104. See Du Mont, supra note 91, at 538 n.38, stating:
Today, de facto functionality simply means that the design performs a
function. Alternatively, de jure functionality is a legal conclusion that the article’s design is
“dictated by function alone,” and it is therefore ineligible for a design patent. (internal citations
omitted). When speaking of de jure functionality…the article’s design was dictated solely by
its function or by function alone. However, it is also commonly articulated as requiring the
design to be primarily non-functional. See, e.g., Rosco, v. Mirror Lite. Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1996). While the Federal Circuit seems to use these terms synonymously (i.e., primarily and
solely functional), its locution could lead to different holdings. Id.
105. In 2011, Congress signed into law the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (2011)), which made significant changes to the patent system, including: Patentable Subject
Matter, changing to a First-Inventor-to-File Priority System, Prior User Rights, Assignee Filing, PostGrant Review Proceedings, Public Participation in USPTO Procedures, USPTO Fees, Patent Marking,
and Best Mode. See Congressional Research Service Report, R42014, https://perma.cc/7FRV-8U8V.
106. See e.g., Michael R. Mattioli, The Impact of Open Source on Pre-Invention Assignment
Contracts, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 207, 227 (2006).
107. Id. (quoting a Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 11 The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson 202 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., Memorial ed. 1904)).
108. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power … to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”).
109. 144 U.S. 254 (1892).
110. Id. at 260.
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Sherman Act in 1890, which prohibited restraints of trade and attempts to
monopolize any part of interstate commerce. 111
However, around the beginning of the 20th century, through certain
decisions 112 Congress was again alerted to abuses of the patent laws by patent
holders seeking to overextend the reaches of their patent-granted
monopolies. In response, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914; this Act,
inter alia, prohibited the sale of patented goods on the condition that the
purchaser not use a competitor’s products if doing so substantially decreased
competition. 113
In addition to the Clayton Act, in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) was created by the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).114
The FTC’s mission is to “protect consumers and promote competition.” 115
Congress passed the FTCA “in response to widespread concern about the
growth and behavior of monopolies and cartels.” 116 The original FTCA
protected the marketplace by prohibiting “unfair methods of
competition.” 117 In 1938, Congress amended the FTCA to further prohibit
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 118 With that amendment, the
consumer, along with business competitors, became a concern of the FTC.
In this regard, when the FTC determines that a company has violated the
prohibitions against “unfair methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices,” it “shall issue . . . an order requiring such person,
partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of
competition or such act or practice.” 119 Following this amendment, and
111. See ch. 646, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); see also Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018)
(explaining “[s]ection 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.’ 15 U. S. C. §1.
This Court has long recognized that, ‘[i]n view of the common law and the law in this country’
when the Sherman Act was passed, the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ is best read to mean ‘undue
restraint.’ Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 59-60, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619
(1911). This Court’s precedents have thus understood §1 ’to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.’ State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 10, 118 S. Ct. 275, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1997)”).
112. E.g., Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296 (6th Cir.
1896) (holding that if the plaintiff obtained a monopoly on its unpatented fasteners via a patent,
“the monopoly in the unpatented staple results as an incident from the monopoly in the use of
complainant’s invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of the patentee’s control over the use of his
invention by others.”); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (holding that a patentee could achieve
a monopolist’s profits either by selling machines at a higher price or by extending his monopoly to
appurtenant products).
113. See Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994)).
114. Chapter 311 of the 63rd Congress, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
115. See Our History, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K9EP-VGDQ].
116. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good
Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1992).
117. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current through Public
Law 116-91, approved December 19, 2019).
118. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (amending
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)) (“Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.”).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (current through Public Law 116-91, approved December 19, 2019).
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generally from the 1930s through the present, antitrust law has viewed
patents as “problematic monopolies that should be curbed to the greatest
extent possible.” 120
Although Congress struck a balance with patent holders in the 1952
Patent Act, the tensions between Congress and patent holders largely
remained. These tensions again came to a head in the latter half of the 20th
century and early part of the 21st century, beginning with the joint Justice
Department (DOJ) and FTC IP-Antitrust Guidelines of 1995. 121 These
guidelines provide that in most cases patent licensing agreements are to be
evaluated by weighing the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of
each agreement.122 Thus, Congress’s attitude towards monopolies over the
years remains clear: while IP laws justifiably grant exclusive rights
or monopoly privileges to creators or inventors, the privileges are ultimately
beholden to public interests. Therefore, Congress has consistently seen the
need to limit the scope of monopolies to protect the interests of the public.
VI. TRADEMARKS/TRADE DRESS
Trade dress is an extension of trademark law, having a judicial origin
that can be traced back through the history of trademark law and tort
common law. 123 Unlike patent law, trademark law is not rooted in the notion
of stimulating innovation. Like misappropriation, it is grounded in the law
of unfair competition and misrepresentation/deceit, where one merchant’s
actions threaten to deceive the customers of another into mistaking the true
source of the junior merchant’s goods or services. 124 In this regard,
trademarks and trade dress are source identifiers. Defined generally, trade
dress is the overall image or appearance used to identify the source of a
product or service to purchasers. 125 Although historically trade dress has
been less recognized than traditional trademarks and service marks per
se, trade dress serves the same function of identifying the origin of its
owners’ goods and services and distinguishing these goods and services from
those of others. 126 To qualify as trade dress for purposes of protection under

120. Alden F. Abbott, The evolving IP-antitrust interface in the USA - the recent gradual weakening
of patent rights, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2(2), 363, (2014).
121. US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995 Guidelines).
122. See id.
123. See Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby–Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 85-87 (1973).
124. See id. at 97.
125. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10, 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1342-43 (2000);
see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764 (1992) (describing trade dress of a product as “essentially its total
image and overall appearance.”).
126. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 209-10.
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Section 32 or Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product must be (1) a
distinctive indicator of origin and (2) nonfunctional. 127
At the outset, the goal of trade dress protection was to prevent obvious
acts of piracy where one manufacturer would “dress” its product like that of
another manufacturer (e.g., copy a competitor’s label), attempting to deceive
consumers into mistakenly purchasing goods from a different maker. 128
However, by the late nineteenth century, courts began to recognize that it
was necessary to protect against not only the approximation of a brand label,
but also the mimicking of product packaging and unique product designs. 129
In light of this increasing need to prevent close copying and piracy, state law
principles for protection began to evolve. In this regard, most early trade
dress cases during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries addressed
only the protectability of wholly nonutilitarian label designs. 130 For
example, one early court recognized the availability of relief on a showing
that “the defendant fraudulently, deceitfully, and with the intent to injure [the
plaintiff’s] business … simulated [the plaintiff’s] wrappers, and thus
deceived the public into buying large quantities of the spurious [product] as
the genuine.” 131 Similarly, another very early court concluded that equity
would enjoin use of the elements making up packaging “when all, or a
number of them, are combined … and so arranged and exhibited that when
they strike the eye of the intending purchaser, possessed of ordinary
intelligence and judgment, the false impression is likely to be produced that
the goods of the plaintiffs are offered.” 132 To this end, a defendant becomes
liable when its use of a mark creates “a likelihood of confusion” about
whether the plaintiff is affiliated or associated with the defendant, or whether
the plaintiff originated, sponsored, or approved of the defendant’s
goods. 133 The early emphasis on fraudulent conduct was modified;
modernly, it matters not whether the defendant created or threatened
confusion intentionally or accidentally. 134
Federal statutory protection for trade dress emerged in 1946 in the guise
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 135 However, when enacted, the Lanham
127. See id.
128. See Stephen F. Mohr et al., U.S. Trade Dress Law, Exploring the Boundaries (Int’l Trademark
Ass’n eds., 1997).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., Isador Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U.S. 179, 180 (1916) (use of
nonfunctional design held confusingly similar to federally registered mark).
131. M. A. Thedford Med. Co. v. Curry, 96 Ga. 89, 93, 22 S.E. 661, 663 (1895).
132. Fisher v. Blank, 33 N.E. 1040, 1041 (N.Y. 1893).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (imposing trademark liability when defendant uses a registered mark
“likely to cause confusion”); see also, regarding unregistered marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2020).
134. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 23:106 (4th ed. 2005) (“The modern
rule at common law is that the issue of infringement of any kind of trade symbol . . . is determined solely
by the likelihood of confusion test.”); id. at § 23:107 (noting that intent to deceive is not an element of
the federal cause of action for trademark; trademark is a “no-fault” tort).
135. See Davis Jr. supra note 13, at 605-06 explaining how “courts hearing unfair competition and
trade dress cases did not create a separate body of federal law, but instead relied equally upon state and

2022

THE CONSTITUTION COMMANDETH

111

Act was not the expansive statute it is today, and it has a long history of
evolution. 136 The Lanham Act has become the main vehicle for protecting
trade dress protection today. 137 Various amendments to the Lanham Act
confirmed that protection had become available not only for registered
trademarks, but also for unregistered trademarks and trade dress of various
types. 138
While trade dress has a long history of clashing with utility patents, the
focus of the instant article is on the ornamental and nonfunctional aspects of
design patents and trade dress. To this end, some argue that the protections
offered by design patents and trade dress serve unique and separate
functions, for both the public and the owner of the intellectual property. 139
However, in practice, the line is very blurred. Essentially, both design
patents and trade dress protection give the owner the right to prohibit another
party from intruding upon its legal rights and to prevent them from using its
federal precedents.” Further explaining that, “[a]s late as the Trademark Act of 1905…the federal cause
of action for infringement extended only to marks registered with the Commissioner of Patents… the
Trademark Act of 1920 recognized for the first time a cause of action against the infringement of
unregistered ‘designations of origin’ (rather than merely of word marks), it nevertheless offered little
guidance on the subject of what might qualify for protection” (footnotes omitted).
136. See Germain, supra note 123, at 109-12, explaining how “[e]arly interpretations of § 43(a) were
[quite] conservative. They either restricted § 43(a) to actions for passing-off or confined its effect to
‘include only such false descriptions or representations as are of substantially the same economic nature
as those which involve infringement or other improper use of trade-marks,’” and further explaining how
the law evolved through court decisions which “sounded the death knell for the single-source rule, and
signaled the birth of a new federal law of unfair competition.” (internal citations omitted).
137. The Lanham Act has its basis in the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3, which grants
Congress the authority to regulate “commerce” – widely defined – which includes trademark, trade name,
and trade dress. As explained by Pollack, supra note 64, at 298-99:
The idea of using the Commerce Clause to expand Congressional power over intellectual
property is not new. The [Supreme] Court alludes to this power as early as the Trade-Mark
Cases in 1879. Congress eventually followed the Court’s suggestion by linking the Lanham
Act, the federal trademark statute, to “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress.” Perhaps in an excess of caution, Congress has rested several pieces of intellectual
property legislation, at least in part, on the Commerce Clause. None of these, however, suggest
Congress believes that by legislating under the Commerce Clause, it can by pass the “limited
times” provision of the Intellectual Property Clause. No court has yet ruled on the
constitutionality of federal intellectual property legislation under the Commerce Clause. While
several authors have argued the constitutionality or constitutional basis of Congressional action
in this field under the Commerce Clause, no one has raised any argument undermining the
Intellectual Property Clause time limit requirement.
138. See Bonder supra note 40, at 12-13 (2004) (citations omitted), explaining that:
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was amended November 16, 1989 to provide for a cause of
action to four categories of statements: (1) “any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof;” (2) “any false designation of origin;” (3) a “false or misleading
description of fact;” and (4) a “false or misleading representation of fact.” The amended version
of section 43(a) added causes of action for false and misleading trademarks and
false advertising. This section also provides protection for trade dress infringement. In
summary, a successful claim for trade dress infringement under 43(a) requires the plaintiff to
establish three elements: (1) that the trade dress has the requisite distinctiveness and, if
necessary, secondary meaning; (2) that it is nonfunctional; and (3) that the defendant has created
a likelihood of confusion among the public as to the source of the product.
139. See id. at 8; see also Ronald J. Horta, Without Secondary Meaning, Do Product Design Trade
Dress Protections Function as Infinite Patents?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 113, 128 (1993) (explaining that
“[t]he stated purposes of design patents and trade dress are very different and no overlap exists between
the two. No authority states that patented designs indicate the source of a product and no authority holds
that trade dress protections are rewards for innovation.”).
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design. As discussed above, design patents only cover ornamental designs
embodied in “articles of manufacture” and, by definition, the ornamentation
embodied in useful objects. 140 In comparison, trademark law, including the
Lanham Act, is not designed to encourage creativity and invention; rather, it
aims to prevent consumer confusion regarding the source of products and
prevents free riding on the good will that trademark owners have built. Thus,
trade dress is premised upon a distinctive, non-functional identification of
the source of a product. However, the effect on competition is the same for
design patent or trade dress infringement: both provide an owner with a cause
of action to prohibit another from using its design, but for very different
purposes (i.e., ornamental re useful object vs. “source”). The net result of
trade dress protection is virtually infinite protection for designs—extending
any patent rights and monopoly well beyond the statutory period expressly
required by the Patent Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, the
extension of design patent protection through trade dress protection may
interfere with the right to copy guaranteed by the Constitution, which
includes designs that are unpatented but would otherwise qualify for design
patent protection. 141 Extending such rights threatens to leave the language of
the Patent Clause without effect.142 This is contrary to the purpose of the
Constitution and violates critical canons of constitutional construction.
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
For protection of product designs, trade dress and design patents have
significant overlap, not only with respect to the subject matter, but also
regarding the tests for validity and infringement. Some argue that design
patents and trade dress protection are intended to serve unique and separate
functions, for both the public and the owner, and the existence of design
patent rights is independent of the ownership of trademark rights.143

140. Useful articles are those which have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Definitions).
141. Trade dress protection for such designs ignores the one-year statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b).
142. As propounded by the successful Petitioners in TrafFix:
Nor is there any indication that in establishing national trademark protection, Congress sought
to disrupt the “carefully crafted bargain” underlying the patent system.… Extending federal
trade dress protection to product configurations that are the subject of expired patents would
deprive the public of the benefit of its bargain and effectively repeal that venerable federal
right. U.S. Pet. Brief, supra note 36, at 28.
143. See David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent – The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 289, 306 (1999), explaining that:
It is not the function of trademark to protect designers against copying per se. Properly
understood, the function of trademark law is to protect the reputation of the mark owner and to
provide accurate information to potential purchasers. It is not to give exclusive property rights
in an object to its maker. This is the difference between a true intellectual property right (which
gives exclusionary rights to the owner) and protection against unfair competition (which seeks
to make sure that the competitive market operates properly).
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However, the Federal Circuit, in Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 144 pointed
out that Ninth Circuit law acknowledges significant differences between the
policies and purposes of trademark/trade dress law, on the one hand, and
patent and copyright laws, on the other hand, stating:
The protection for source identification… must be balanced against “a
fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor’s product
. . . .” This “right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright
laws.” In contrast, trademark law allows for a perpetual monopoly and its
use in the protection of “physical details and design of a product” must be
limited to those that are “nonfunctional.” 145

In closing this discussion, the court paused to clarify what it had not
considered:
Because we conclude that the jury’s findings of nonfunctionality of the
asserted trade dresses were not supported by substantial evidence, we do
not reach [Defendant’s] arguments on the fame and likely dilution of the
asserted trade dresses, the Patent Clause of the Constitution, or the dilution
damages. 146

At least one commentator has come to a similar conclusion regarding
the differences in trademark/trade dress law and design patent law as a result
of the policies underlying each type of protection, concluding that, “[i]t is
evident that limited trade dress protection can be provided for expired patent
features without violating patent law principles or undermining trade dress
law objectives.” 147 In formulating these assertions, the commentator
focused on the underlying policies of the Patent and Lanham Acts, claiming
that each serves a distinctly different purposes and, as a result, no conflict
exists. 148 However, the authors of the instant article now assert that the
underlying policies, albeit arguably different, cannot save trade dress
protection that has been acquired for a product configuration previously
protected by an expired design patent from violating the “Limited Times”
provision of the Patent Clause.
For some, this policy argument is rooted in the Tenth Circuit’s holding
in Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 149 where the court
opined that, where patent law and trade dress law intersect, the policies of
144. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversed and remanded by Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137
S. Ct. 429 (2016) on grounds unrelated to the Federal Circuit’s statement regarding trade dress). The
Court reversed the Federal Circuit, stating that, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s narrower reading of ‘article of
manufacture’ cannot be squared with the text of § 289.” Id. at 435-36.
145. Id. at 991 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
147. Michael S. Perez, Reconciling the Patent Act and the Lanham Act: Should Product
Configurations Be Entitled to Trade Dress Protection After the Expiration of a Utility or Design Patent?,
4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 383, 413 (1996). But note that this view was expressed before the modern era
of Wal-Mart (U.S. 2000), and that it totally failed to consider any possible constitutional conflict.
148. See id. at 403 (explaining that the purpose of the Patent Act is, “primarily to stimulate further
invention and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires,” compared to the
primary purpose of the Lanham Act, which is “to prevent consumer confusion in the marketplace due to
false or misleading marks.”) (internal citations omitted).
149. 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995).
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both federal statutes must be balanced “in a way that preserves the purposes
of both and fosters harmony between them.” 150 Twenty odd years later, the
Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Arlington Specialties, Inc. v.
Urban Aid, Inc., 151 stating:
Because trademark protection for trade dress has no time limit, giving one
competitor a perpetual and exclusive right to a useful product feature
would result in a perpetual competitive advantage. “The Lanham Act does
not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its [limited]
period of exclusivity.” 152

However, and like the holding in Vornado Air, such arguments fail to
address the constitutional conflict of allowing trade dress protection for
expired patent features as a result of patent law’s specific statutory scheme
rooted in the Constitution. In particular, keep in mind that the Patent Clause
of the Constitution mandates that Congress grant monopolies only for limited
times to inventions or designs that meet specific standards of patentability. 153
As explained by Professor Malla Pollack, “[t]he [Patent/Copyright] Clause
of the Constitution, even read with the Commerce Clause, prevents Congress
from giving authors or inventors exclusive rights unbounded by premeasured
time limitations.” 154
Moreover, the views set forth above by commentators, such as Mr.
Perez, were made pre-2000, before the modern era of Wal-Mart Stores v.
Samara Bros. 155, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. 156, and
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 157 In summary, as
discussed in further detail below, these modern-era cases represent a
paradigm shift in the Supreme Court’s treatment of trademarks as a species
of intellectual property. As explained by Professor David Welkowitz, these
cases suggest:
First…that WalMart was the beginning of a paradigm shift in trademark
law. Second, some of the lower courts have not fully implemented this
new paradigm, perhaps in part because they do not recognize it, perhaps
in part out of habit, or perhaps in part because they are accustomed to
developing trademark law on their own, with the Supreme Court operating
largely in the background. Third, the new paradigm could lead to a
150. Id. at 1507.
151. 847 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 2017).
152. Id. at 418 (quoting TrafFix, 532 U.S., at 34). In affirming the District Court, the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion was full of philosophical explanations such as these:
This feature of trademark law presents both an opportunity for producers and a potential threat
to consumers. Other forms of federal intellectual property — patents and copyrights — come
with time limits, after which competitors and the public are free to copy the protected item.
Trademark protection does not expire, though, as long as the protected mark is being used in
commerce to designate the origin of a product. Id.
153. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
154. Pollack, supra note 64, at 260.
155. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).
156. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
157. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
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reexamination of recent extensions of trademark law that tend to treat
trademark less like unfair competition and more like property. 158

Wal-Mart addresses one of the latest developments in trademark law,
namely, the use of the design of a product itself as a trademark. Then, in
Dastar, the Court made statements to the effect that federal law recognizes
a right to copy. For example, the Court declared broadly that the “right to
copy . . . passes to the public” upon expiration of a patent. 159 Following this,
the Court quoted a passage from TrafFix, cautioning against the “‘misuse or
overextension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally
occupied by patent or copyright.” 160 The Court returned to The Trade-Mark
Cases to note that “[f]ederal trademark law ‘has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery,’” thus, accentuating the separation of trademark from
other intellectual property. 161
However, in practice, the line is blurred, and there is no statutory
guidance or specific provision to make it clear whether a design should be
protected as either a design patent or trade dress, or both. 162 Professor David
Welkowitz has explained the practical overlap between design patent
protection and trade dress protection:
[E]ven a cursory examination of the elements of trade dress infringement
for product configurations and the elements of design patent infringement
reveals marked similarities. These similarities suggest that current trade
dress law has crossed over the line separating patent protection from trade
dress protection. The task here is to cut through the rhetoric of what the
laws are supposed to protect and to focus on what they actually protect. A
closer examination reveals a true similarity in the actual operation of these
two sets of laws. This invites further suspicion that trademark has intruded
improperly into patent law. 163

Welkowitz goes on to conclude that:

[T]he facets of trademark law touted as distinguishing the two—the
requirements of distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and nonfunctionality—in the end do not do enough to preclude courts from
enjoining the simple act of copying another’s non-patented design (or a
design whose patent has expired). Second, the elements of infringement
under both design patent and trade dress law look for similar things, and
ask similar questions. This further indicates a confluence, rather than a
separation, of the two forms of protection. 164

Furthermore, courts often have struggled when attempting to harmonize
trade dress and design patent protection for product design. In this regard, it
158. David Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1687 (2004).
159. 539 U.S. at 33.
160. Id. at 34 (citing to TrafFix, 532 U.S., at 29).
161. Id.
162. This is unlike the functionality doctrine that rejects trade dress protection for functional designs
and steers such designs toward utility patents. See 1 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON
ON TRADEMARKS § 2A.10 (2019).
163. Welkowitz, supra note 143, at 343.
164. Id. at 357.
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has been common practice for courts to assert that design patents and
trademarks protect different things and, as such, there is little likelihood of
interference with each other’s core values.165 As discussed above—and
unsatisfactorily—these discussions seldom go beyond this conclusory
assertion, which is inappropriate. 166 For example, in Groeneveld Transp.
Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 167 the majority 168 emphatically
expressed its policy orientation, namely to “reaffirm that trademark law is
designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate product
manufacturers from lawful competition.” 169 In so doing, the majority stated:
A manufacturer who desires protection against copying must satisfy the
requirements of protectability under the copyright or patent regimes and
must also submit itself to the limited time periods of protection afforded
under those regimes. Those requirements and their attendant restrictions
incentivize valuable artistic and scientific creations while ensuring that the
social costs of monopoly are contained within reasonable bounds. 170

The majority starkly contrasted the property-based protections derived from
the Patent Clause from the deceit-based protection based on unfair
competition principles:
The clear import of the twin principles that copying in the absence of
copyright or patent protection often serves useful purposes, and that the
concern of trademark law is not about copying per se but about copying
that engenders consumer confusion, is that the appropriate “intent” to

165. See e.g., In Re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 929 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Zip Dee, Inc., v.
Domestic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 606 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Herman Miller, Inc. v. A. Studio S.R.L., No.
1:04-CV-781, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59210, at *49-50 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006); In re Yardley, 493
F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1991); Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1993); Mech.
Plastics Corp. v. Titan Techs., Inc., 823 F.Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Winning Ways, Inc., v. Holloway
Sportswear, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 1457, 1461 (D. Kan. 1995); Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883
F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996); Ashley Furniture Indus. v. Sangiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 376-77 (4th Cir.
1999).
166. As explained by Moshe Bonder:
Trade dress law is not intended to provide exclusive property rights, nor should it be used in
this manner. In recognizing the differences between the two acts courts have consistently
identified three principles in developing a workable distinction. “First, courts have asserted that
[the acts aim to] protect different [items] and therefore there is little likelihood of interference
with each other’s core values. Unfortunately, [this argument] seldom goes much beyond the
assertion.” Second, courts without exception have held that when a feature is functional it is
not entitled to trade dress protection; this requirement is a distinguishing element not required
in patent law. Third, where courts have asserted a requirement to establish confusion in
maintaining a trade dress action, it has resulted in an important separation from the
requirements of design patent infringement. Bonder, supra note 40, at 23-24.
167. 730 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2013).
168. Id. at 521 (Judge Helene N. White dissented, arguing that the majority’s articulation of the key
issue presented framed the issue on appeal “in a manner that assumes the very issues to be considered –
whether the trade dress is functional and whether there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion—without
any acknowledgement that reasonable inferences to the contrary not only exist but were accepted by a
jury and the district court”).
169. Id. at 500.
170. Id. at 512.
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focus on is not the
to deceive or confuse. 171

intent

to copy but

117

rather

the

intent

For purposes of validity, design patents protect the “new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 172 An ornamental design
can be surface ornamentation on an article of manufacture, the configuration
of an article of manufacture, or a combination of both. 173 An article of
manufacture, unlike the subject of copyright protection, must necessarily
serve a utilitarian purpose. 174 The test for infringement of a design patent is
the ordinary observer test, which the Supreme Court historically described
as follows:
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance
is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other. 175

Prior to Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, 176 the test for design patent
infringement was a two-part inquiry. However, the ruling in Egyptian
Goddess removed the second, more difficult, requirement that the design
meet a “point of novelty” test.177 As a result of the point-of-novelty test
being removed, the ordinary-observer test became the sole test for
infringement. 178 Under the ordinary observer test, the factfinder need only
determine that the ordinary observer is likely to be deceived 179 into buying
one product thinking it to be another for a finding of infringement. 180 The
Federal Circuit, in Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 181 clarified the
171. Id. at 514.
172. 35 U.S.C.S. § 171(a) (Current through Public Law 117-39, approved August 31, 2021)(For a
design to be patentable, this section requires that a design be “original”); M.P.E.P. § 1504(d) (“a design
which simulates an existing object or person is not original as required by the statute”); Id. (“a design for
an article which simulates a well known or naturally occurring object or person should be rejected under
35 U.S.C. 171 as nonstatutory subject matter in that the claimed design lacks originality”) (For example,
the CCPA in In re Smith, 25 U.S.P.Q. 359, 360 (C.C.P.A. 1935), stated that “to take a natural form, in a
natural pose, . . . does not constitute invention,” when affirming the rejection of a claim to a baby doll).
173. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871); In re Blum, 374 F.2d 904, 907 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
174. See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F. 2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
175. See Gorham Mfg. Co., 81 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added); see also Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reaffirming the use of the ordinary observer test as the
standard for design patent infringement).
176. 543 F.3d 665, 671 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
177. Id. at 668.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 670-71 The authors note that “likelihood,” not actual deception (whether intentional or
not), is a common characteristic of trademarks and, more particularly, trade dress. Contrast this with
design patents, in which actual deception is not a relevant consideration for infringement).
180. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding
that Apple was not required to show that any Apple customers were actually deceived into buying a
Samsung phone thinking that it was an Apple phone, but that the phones were so substantially similar
that it was likely that the ordinary observer would be deceived). See supra note 144, rev’d, Samsung
Elecs. Co. v. Apple, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (reversed and remanded on other grounds).
181. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d, Samsung Elecs. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 435-36 (on grounds
unrelated to the court’s statement regarding actual deception and the ordinary observer test).
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deception consideration for the ordinary observer test; the court explained
that actual deception is not a requirement for a finding of design patent
infringement, and that the ordinary observer test set forth in Gorham Co.
only requires a finding that an “ordinary purchaser would be likely to mistake
the [accused] designs for the [patented design].” 182 However, in a
subsequent case, Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Dolgencorp LLC, 183 the Federal
Circuit deemphasized focus on consumer deception and clarified that the
ordinary observer test should consider element-by-element distinctions
between the patented design and the prior art, and between the patented
design and the accused product. 184 In any event, some argue that “[u]sing
consumer deception as the lynchpin to the finding of [design patent]
infringement unmoors the infringement analysis from protecting the
innovative aspects of designs and instead hinges protections on the consumer
of the product.” 185 Indeed, protection through the lens of the consumer is
more consistent with the goal of trademark law than design patent law. 186
Moreover, by focusing the infringement analysis on the consumer, courts
have interwoven the trademark objectives into the design patent
infringement test. 187 Tying the infringement analysis to deception of the
ordinary consumer pushes design patents into the waters of trade dress
protections, resulting in increased overlap between the two means for
protecting product designs.
As discussed above, trade dress protects “the total image and overall
appearance of a product or business as reflected in such features as size,
shape, color or color combinations, design of a label, texture, graphics or
sales techniques.” 188 Generally, trade dress protection includes the
packaging or design of a product. At least formally, trade dress protection
for product designs follows the structure of other trademark and trade dress
analyses, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart. 189 First, the design
must be a “distinctive” source identifier 190, which can be demonstrated in
either of two ways: by showing that the design is “inherently distinctive” or
182. Id. at 1000 (citing Gorham, 81 U.S. at 530).
183. 958 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
184. See id. at 1343. The court further explained that:
[T]he district court struck the correct balance of considering the ornamental aspects of the
design while remaining focused on how an ordinary observer would view the overall design.
See Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1295 (“[The court] recited the significant differences between the
ornamental features of the two designs but, in determining infringement, it mainly focused on
whether an ordinary observer would be deceived into thinking that any of the [accused] designs
were the same as [the] patented design”). Id. at 1344.
185. Carl J. Hall, A Patently Offensive Test: Proposing Changes to the Test for Design Patent
Infringement, 53 VAL. U.L. REV. 297, 328 (2018).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Joel W. Reese, Defining the Elements of Trade Dress Infringement under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 2 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 104 (1994).
189. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).
190. Id.
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by showing that the design has “acquired distinctiveness” (a.k.a “secondary
meaning”). 191 If the design is distinctive, a plaintiff must show that there is
a likelihood of confusion (of goods, source, sponsorship or approval)
between its trade dress and the trade dress of another, and that the design is
nonfunctional. 192 However, it is important to note that the issue of when
trade dress can be considered inherently distinctive, and when it requires
secondary meaning, has been addressed in Wal-Mart. 193 The Court
determined that when a trade dress is found in the packaging of a product the
trade dress might be inherently distinctive, but when the trade dress in
question is of the product design or configuration itself, secondary meaning
is required. 194
In view of Egyptian Goddesss, the tests for trademark infringement and
design patent infringement both appear to involve questions of consumer
perception. 195 To this end, trade dress is infringed if a similar design is
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 196 The
primary, and often exclusive, test for determining likelihood of confusion is
the similarity of the designs. Although packaged slightly differently, when
viewed from the perspective of a lay juror, the determination of the
likelihood of consumer confusion for both design patent infringement and
trade dress infringement is essentially one in the same. Thus, under both
design patent and trademark law, a firm may prevent competitors from using
designs that are likely to cause confusion and/or deception.
The infringement tests are not the only area of overlap between design
patent and trade dress protections for product design: the subject matter is
equally comparable. 197 The most obvious similarity between design patent
law and trade dress law is that both are aimed at protecting non-functional
features. Additionally, similarities also exist in the requirements for
qualifying for protection under both doctrines. The distinctiveness
requirement for trade dress and the nonobviousness and novelty
requirements for design patents are akin in that both measure the amount of
singularity the claimant needs to attain protection. Therefore, it is evident
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 216.
194. See id.
195. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV.
845 (2003) (stating that both “trademark and design patent infringement focus on the commercial impact
of the competing works”).
196. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2020). Also, §32 regarding registered marks.
197. In this regard, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act significantly broadened the availability of
trademark-type protection for product designs beyond protection for designs actually registered and thus
protectable under 32(1). This also complicated the Compco phrase “or other federal statutory protection”.
See generally Germain, supra note 123. Whereas Compco (and Sears) both applied to federal law versus
state law conflicts, resolvable via the Supremacy Clause, once trade dress became federalized, via
registration or even section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the conflict became federal law versus federal law,
and there the Supremacy Clause is no help at all. Thus enters the concept of Superfluity, as will be
explained in further detail below.
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that both the Lanham Act and the Patent Act actually provide similar
protection for similar subject matter. As a result, trade dress protection of
product designs has the potential for undermining the goals of the Patent Act
by extending a patentee’s monopoly on a particular design beyond the
absolute time limits established by Congress and commanded by the Patent
Clause. One commentator points out some salient similarities and
dissimilarities between trade dress and design patents, stating:
Because the trade dress and design patent protection are arguably nearly
identical following Egyptian Goddess, allowing the overlap of protection
would essentially create an extended right. This rights overlap is
particularly troublesome because together they cancel out each other’s
limitations. Trade dress protection for product design requires that
secondary meaning be established before the protection attaches, a burden
much lessened by the immediate protection a design patent grants. Design
patents allow immediate protection, but they are limited because they only
last for a short period of time. However, trade dress protection could
extend the same right indefinitely. 198

The question is not simply whether the limits of the Patent Clause apply
to federal patent laws, but whether those limits impact any laws that may
grant patent-like protection under the guise of another federal legislative
scheme. As discussed above, it is well recognized that protection for product
design trade dress has the potential to overlap with design patent
protection. 199 Both intellectual property systems are eligible to provide some
form of protection to the configuration of a particular product. Unlike patent
protection (which will at some point expire, thus comporting with the Patent
Clause requirement that protections exist only “for limited times”), federal
trade dress protection (provided pursuant to the Commerce Clause) is
potentially limitless: it remains effective for as long as the trade dress
continues to serve as an indication of source. 200
198. Ellie B. Adkins, Unchecked Monopolies: The Questionable Constitutionality of Design Patent
and Product Design Trade Dress Overlap in Light of Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 4 INTELL.
PROP. BRIEF 57, 67 (2013).
199. See e.g., Jenny Yoo Collection, Inc. v. David’s Bridal, Inc., No. 1:16—cv—02647 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 8, 2016) (alleging both trade dress and design patent infringement in designs of convertible
bridesmaid’s dresses); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co. Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181 (C.D. Cal.
2014); Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. CV17-2523 PSG Ex, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211140 (C.D. Cal.
June 29, 2017) (alleging trade dress and design patent infringement in a line of designer footwear). Courts
have explicitly endorsed these overlapping claims. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 638 (“[A] product’s different
qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for
protection of intellectual property.”).
200. As explained by the Petitioners in TrafFix,
The consequences of this phenomenon [the notion of federal trade dress protection in a
product’s configuration] are far-reaching, and bring federal trademark law into direct conflict
with patent law and the policies underlying that law. Quite unlike product packaging, labeling,
or even ornamental design, there are typically only a finite number of configurations or shapes
that a product may take. That is especially true in the case of a utility patented invention, made
to perform a particular use or function. At the same time, cloaking product configurations with
federal trade dress protection does not simply give the producer a tool to strengthen source
identification of its product, but the perpetual right to use that configuration for as long as the
producer likes, effectively - and indefinitely - taking the configuration out of the public domain.
In the case of a patented invention, this result directly interferes with the constitutionally
grounded and time-honored right of the public to copy and use the subject of expired patents.
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Thus, herein lies the Constitutional conflict: trade dress protection of
product designs, federalized 201 through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
which was enacted under the broad constitutional power grant of the
Commerce Clause, 202 conflicts with the Patent Clause by offering potentially
unlimited, patent-like protection to designs that never met or do not meet the
criteria for patentability (e.g., the invention must at least be novel, useful,
and nonobvious), thereby evading the “Limited Times” provision of the
Patent Clause. 203 As explained by one commentator in discussing the
eligibility for trade dress protection after design patents expire, “we have no
means to reconcile the issue,” therefore, “we have to directly confront the
issue between the right of the public to copy and trade dress protection.” 204
And, as explained next, there is no reason to conclude that Congress intended Section 43(a), or
any other provision of the Lanham Act, to achieve that result. U.S. Pet. Brief, supra note 36, at
27.
201. As explained by Dowell, supra note 64, at 168-69:
Federal trademark law is no different from state trademark law. The standards for federal and
state trade dress infringement claims are the same. The Lanham Act merely federalizes the
common law of trademarks and unfair competition. As applied to product designs, section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act prohibits “any false designation of origin” that is “likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” Courts have read into this general prohibition all of the
technical requirements for trademark protection of a product design. The doctrines of secondary
meaning/inherent distinctiveness, functionality, and the multifactor confusion test are entirely
judge-made and a product of the common law. Because federal and state trademark law are the
same, any conflict between federal patent law and state trademark law must also exist between
federal patent law and federal trademark law.
202. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, known as the Commerce Clause, states that the United States
Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”
203. About 15 years ago, Professor Welkowitz, in an insightful article, The Supreme Court and
Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004), saw this latest conflict
in the context of copyright law. In his view, Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar all “resisted uses of trademark
law that prevent copying of public domain materials.” Id. at 1687. Specifically:
[In Dastar], the Court again asserted that the Lanham Act’s foundations “were not designed to
protect originality or creativity.” In what must be termed a rather ironic use of a recent case, it
concluded: “To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that [section] 43(a) created a species
of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.” Citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 208 (2003)… for the limiting proposition in Dastar demonstrates just how far
removed the Court wants trademark law to be from traditional intellectual property.
Id., quoting Dastar (citations omitted). (emphasis added). He soon expanded by writing:
The primary message seems to be that the post-Lanham Act expansion of trademark law into
something akin to traditional intellectual property law deeply concerns the Court. Admittedly,
the justices may have different reasons for their concerns… Several of the Justices may be
concerned that Congress is beginning to reach the boundaries of its enumerated powers.
Although the Commerce Clause gives Congress broad power to regulate, the existence of a
specific power to regulate intellectual property, a power that allows rights only for “limited
times” and that impliedly contains other limitations, may be viewed as an implicit limit on
Congress’s power to expand the scope of trademark rights, especially where those rights would
rival the limited intellectual property rights provided in the Patent and Copyright Clause.
Id., at 1689, citing Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (other citations
omitted). And finally, he opined that “the Court may be signaling that there are limits to Congress’s
power to regulate these areas under the Commerce Clause, as opposed to the Patent and Copyright
Clause.” Id. at 1700.
204. Takashi Saito, Dressing Design Patent: A Proposal for Amending the Design Patent Law in
Light of Trade Dress, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 682, 686 (2007). In a recent opinion, the
Third Circuit, in Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 2288 (3d
Cir. January 28,2021), explained:
By contrast, trademark law protects not inventions or designs per se, but branding. A trademark
is a “word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a person[] . . . to identify and distinguish his
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TrafFix 205 provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address
the potential conflict between “unlimited” trade dress protection and the
limits provided by the Patent Clause. Although the Court resolved the
dispute before it on the basis of the doctrine of functionality, it went out of
its way to highlight the underlying and still unresolved constitutional
issue: 206
[Defendant] and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of the
Constitution of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility
patent from claiming trade dress protection. We need not resolve this
question. If, despite the rule that functional features may not be the subject
of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the
practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough
to consider the matter. 207

As the Court was able to resolve the issue without reaching the constitutional
question, it prudently declined to reach that question.
The TrafFix opinion signaled a first step toward considering the conflict
between the Patent Clause and trade dress protection provided pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. But the case’s focus on utility patents and the
doctrine of functionality resolved the controversy, providing little guidance
on how to handle the question of whether the non-functional features claimed
in an expired design patent could thereafter be protected as trade dress,
thereby arguably extending the design patent from a type of protection
offered “for limited times” to one of potentially limitless duration.208
Notably, the issue presented to the Supreme Court in TrafFix did not
develop overnight. Leading up to the TrafFix decision, a number of lower
courts had been faced with the issue, each concluding that the same feature
can simultaneously or sequentially be protected under some combination of
the patent and trademark laws, upholding an anti-copying protectionist status

or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods.” 15 U.S.C. §1127. Trademark law can protect a product’s “trade dress[,] [which] is the
overall look of a product or business.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308
(3d Cir. 2014). That includes not only a product’s packaging but also its design, such as its size,
shape, and color. Id. at *6-7 (internal citations omitted).
205. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
206. Functionality, including aesthetic functionality, is a purely judge-made doctrine designed to
reconcile the tension between the patent and trademark laws. See Christopher J. Kellner, Rethinking the
Procedural Treatment of Functionality: Confronting the Inseparability of Useful, Aesthetically Pleasing,
and Source-identifying Features of Product Deigns, 46 EMORY L.J. 913 (1997). The doctrine of
functionality was eventually codified in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (Section 33(b)(8) of the
Lanham Act). However, some view the term “aesthetic functionality” as oxymoronic, a view that the
authors disagree with. See McCarthy on Trademarks § 7:81, at 7–298 (“Aesthetic functionality is an
oxymoron. Ornamental aesthetic designs are the antithesis of utilitarian designs.”).
207. It is notable that the granted writ of certiorari included “the issue whether the existence of an
expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the patentee’s claiming trade dress protection in the
product’s design. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28.
208. See generally Clifford W. Browning, TrafFix Revisited: Exposing the Design Flaw in the
Functionality Doctrine, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1059, 1059 (2004); see also Karl Horlander, The U.S.
Constitutional Limits of Product Configuration Trade Dress Rights, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 752, 753-56
(2007).
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quo. 209 In the discussion below, we will review how most of the lower
courts, with their protectionist attitudes, improperly restricted the public’s
right to copy. Notably, these decisions have essentially denied that such a
right exists, with discussions that seldom go beyond a conclusory assertion
that the same feature can simultaneously or sequentially be protected
through a combination of patent and trademark laws.
VIII. 20TH CENTURY APPROACH LEADING UP TO TRAFFIX
As evidenced by the Singer, Sears, Compco, and Bonito-Boats
decisions, for over 100 years the Supreme Court has been defending the
public’s right to copy, standing up time and again against protectionists. 210
It’s quite clear that protectionism is proliferating in the niche practice of
intellectual property. Clients pay lawyers to protect their intellectual
property, which is often the foundation of their business, so, naturally,
lawyers are going to “zealously” pursue every available option to protect
their clients’ interests. Patent law is designed to encourage innovation and
the dissemination of knowledge. 211 The reasonable underlying belief is that
a societally optimal level of innovation requires some degree of invention
protection to incentivize creation and knowledge dissemination. 212
However, granting that some level of protection is necessary, overprotection
imposes clear losses on consumers and competitors. Protectionist attitudes
and judicial status quo have led to the acceptance of a conflict-containing
dual protection strategy for product designs. 213
As noted above, a number of lower courts have concluded that the same
feature can simultaneously or sequentially be protected under some
combination of design patent and trademark laws. 214 This, indeed, is the
209. See generally Saidman, supra note 65, at 839 (discussing how anti-copying, or protectionist,
attitudes appear in these and other court opinions leading up to the TrafFix decision).
210. See section II of this article.
211. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9 (1966).
212. As explained by James Madison, because an invention is the fruit of individual labor, the
individual should reap the reward. Also, society benefited by rewarding the inventor. Through the reward
of a government-sponsored monopoly, invention and public disclosure are encouraged. “The right to
useful inventions . . . belong[s] to the inventors. The public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
213. One commentator referred to section 43(a) as “the most protectionist design law of them all.”
See Melissa R. Gleiberman, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037 (1993) (citing J.H. Reichman, Design
Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19
U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 87 (1989)).
214. See e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d at 930; In re Yardley, 493 F.2d at 1394;
Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Frabriche Automobili E Corse, 944 F.2d at 1240; Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 63839; Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Titan Techs., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding,
“a product’s different aspects can be protected simultaneously by more than one of the statutory means
for the protection of intellectual property.”); Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 1457, 1460-61 (D. Kan. 1995) (while the court showed concern about acquisition of secondary
meaning during the design patent period, the court denied summary judgment for the defendant,
emphasizing that no court had refused dual protection.); Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F.
Supp. 955, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that there is no conflict between design patent and trade
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traditional view, as expressed in a number of cases. In this regard, two
decisions by the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) 215
form the cornerstone for many later court decisions that find no conflict
between trademark law and patent law and, more particularly, condone the
use of trade dress and design patent for dual protection of a product’s
configuration.
In the first case, In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 216 the CCPA allowed
trademark registration of a product configuration (a wine bottle design)
notwithstanding the fact that the configuration was the subject of an expired
design patent. In so holding, the court totally and blithely ignored the
established doctrine of patent law that indubitably provides others with a
right to copy the subject matter of an expired patent.217 Clearly, the absence
of any discussion of this “right to copy” recognized by the Supreme Court
illustrates the narrow focus of the analysis in Mogen David. As noted by one
commentator:
The court did finally discuss the then recently decided Sears and Compco
cases and distinguished them on the basis that they involved federal
preemption of state laws. Incredibly, all three of the Mogen David
opinions lacked any mention of the Supreme Court cases of Singer or
Kellogg or Scott Paper, all of which had a strong right to copy flavor. How
the [CCPA] case came to be taken so seriously by so many courts in their
later decisions is therefore somewhat mystifying. 218

In the second case, In re Honeywell, Inc., 219 which was decided several
years after Mogen David, the CCPA permitted trademark registration for
certain features of a thermostat that were previously claimed in an expired
design patent. In so holding, the CCPA stated, “this court decided [in Mogen
David I] that the public interest—protection from confusion, mistake, and
deception in the purchase of goods and services—must prevail over any
alleged extension of design patent rights, when a trademark is non-functional
and does in fact serve as a means to distinguish the goods of the trademark
owner from those of others.” 220 Neither Mogen David nor Honeywell
mentions any possible constitutional conflict. Most later court decisions
addressing the issue of trade dress protection for the subject matter of

dress protection because the protections serve different purposes, and further stating that this view is
consistent with other cases.); Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
215. These two decisions are In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, (C.C.P.A. 1964) and In
re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
216. 328 F.2d 925.
217. See, e.g., Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (explaining that the right
to make an article as it was made during the life of a patent “passed to the public upon the expiration of
the patent”).
218. Saidman, supra note 65, at 839.
219. 497 F.2d 1344 (CCPA 1974).
220. Id. at 1348.
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expired design patents have followed the incomplete Mogen
David/Honeywell rationale. 221
One appellate case that deserves attention is Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio
Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 222 which demonstrates how a
misfocused and overbroad reading of § 43(a) can undermine the integrity of
the patent system. The majority in Ferrari determined that the exterior
shapes and features of two FERRARI (plaintiff) automobiles had acquired
secondary meaning and were nonfunctional. 223 The court further held that
the plaintiff had proven likelihood of confusion between its cars and the
defendant’s automobiles. 224 Although the exterior designs of plaintiff’s
automobiles were potentially patentable, the plaintiff never sought a design
patent for either design. Instead, the plaintiff relied on trade dress protection
under the Lanham Act which, from the viewpoint of the plaintiff, is far
superior because of its potentially infinite duration. In so holding, the
majority specifically noted that “[c]ourts have consistently rejected [the]
argument
that the
availability
of
design
patent
protection
precludes applicability of the Lanham Act for products whose trade dress
have acquired strong secondary meaning.” 225 The majority further held that
this broad protection did not conflict with federal patent law for two reasons:
first, because federal trademark law and federal patent law address different
interests and objectives; and second, because Compco and Sears “involved
only the preemption of state unfair competition law by federal patent law,
not the scope of federal trademark or unfair competition law.” 226
In dissent, Judge Kennedy explained that “while the purposes of the
Lanham Act and federal patent laws are not identical,” there is nonetheless
“some overlap and congruity of purpose among these laws. Both the Lanham
Act and federal patent laws affect commercial activity, particularly in the
area of design patents.” 227 Undeniably, the Sears-Compco-Bonito Boats line
of decisions explicitly recognized that federal patent laws and unfair
competition laws are interrelated. 228 In Judge Kennedy’s view, “the
rationale applied in this trilogy of cases … applies with equal force to federal
trademark laws.” 229 Thus, Judge Kennedy concluded that:
[T]he criteria used by the majority to determine the availability and scope
of protection by the Lanham Act for unpatented designs … enlarge the
221. For example, in In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974), a case involving copyrights, the
CCPA held that an overlap in protection was available under the proposition that different IP rights have
different purposes, and if a work has many parts it may be appropriate to protect different parts with
different regimes.
222. 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 1246-47.
224. Id. at 1244.
225. Id. at 1240.
226. Id. at 1241.
227. Id. at 1253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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Lanham Act’s scope of protection beyond its statutory language and
congressional intent, and result in an injunction that runs afoul of the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Sears, Compco and Bonito Boats. Congress
intended that the rights in a design should expire with their design patent.
The effect of the majority’s holding is to give Ferrari the equivalent of a
design patent in perpetuity. 230

Another noteworthy appellate case is Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc. 231 There,
the Seventh Circuit decided 2-1, over a thought-provoking constitutionbased dissent by Judge Cudahy, that “courts have consistently held that a
product’s different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or
successively, by more than one statutory means for protection of intellectual
property.” 232 The majority opinion utterly fails to directly address the
concept of the constitutional right to copy. Instead, it attempts to sweep
Judge Cudahy’s concerns aside with two arguments, neither of which is
particularly convincing. The first is that trade dress protection is not the
equivalent of design patent protection. 233 The majority bases this argument
on the fact that the two forms of protection serve different purposes, have
different criteria (pointing again to the fact that trademark infringement
requires proof of likelihood of confusion), and represent distinct bodies of
law. 234 Because of these differences, the majority explains its belief that
product design trade dress does not provide patent-like protection for
designs:
While a patent creates a type of monopoly pricing power by giving the
patentee the exclusive right to make and sell the innovation, a trademark
gives the owner only the right to preclude others from using the mark when
such use is likely to cause confusion or to deceive. 235

Although this argument has some superficial appeal, it glosses over the
practical effect of providing trade dress protection to product designs: when
the design of the product is protected against imitation by others, this
protection is virtually the same as that stemming from a design patent. Thus,
the product design trade dress does provide “patent-like” protection. 236
Judge Cudahy effectively refutes the majority’s reliance on the differences
between the two forms of protection as sufficient to obviate any conflict:

230. Id. This position aligns with the extreme position taken by one particular author and with which
the current authors disagree. See infra notes 408-09.
231. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 638-39.
233. Id. at 637.
234. See id. at 637-38.
235. Id. at 637.
236. At best, the practical effects of the “additional elements” of secondary meaning and likelihood
of confusion seem to be that product design trade dress protection extends only to a portion of the universe
of product designs that may be covered by design patents. With respect to those designs it does cover
(regardless of whether they were covered by a design patent or even whether they would meet the
standards for such protection), product design trade dress protection does provide “patent-like”
protection—given that the product design is the mark, there is no way to use the product design without
infringing the mark, effectively granting the manufacturer a monopoly in the product design.
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It is also incorrect or irrelevant to say that there is no conflict between
configuration trademarks and the design patent law, because in a
trademark case a plaintiff must also prove secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion. Likelihood of confusion only relates to whether
there has been an infringement, not whether a product configuration is
entitled to protection in the first place. In fact, Compco explicitly rejected
likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning as sufficient reasons to
grant a monopoly:
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who,
knowing that the public is relying upon an original manufacturer’s
reputation for quality and integrity, deceive the public by palming off
their copies as the original. That an article copied from an
unpatented article could be made in some other way, that the design
is “nonfunctional” and not essential to the use of either article, that
the configuration of the article copied may have a “secondary
meaning” which identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may
be “confusion” among purchasers as to which article is which or as
to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State’s
law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless
of the copier’s motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish
a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of
copying and selling. 237

The majority’s second argument challenges Judge Cudahy’s reliance on
a number of Supreme Court decisions—including Sears, Compco, and
Bonito Boats—as misplaced, because those decisions involved questions of
potential conflicts between state and federal law, and were based on the
Supremacy Clause. 238 The majority stated that the preemption principles
espoused in those cases are inapplicable where a claim under federal
trademark law is involved, relying in part on the language in Compco that
referred to the availability of “other federal statutory protection.” 239 Further,
the majority noted that language in Bonito Boats even allows for state
protection of trade dress without conflict with the federal patent scheme. 240
Judge Cudahy’s dissent contains a compelling rebuttal to each of these
points. With respect to the fact that at least some of the cited decisions
involved questions of state law, and therefore were concerned with the
application of the Supremacy Clause, he stated that compartmentalizing
these decisions fails to face the reality that the Lanham Act is effectively
nothing more than the federalization of the common law of trademarks and
unfair competition. 241 Judge Cudahy further states:
237. Id. at 649 (Cudahy, J., dissenting, quoting 376 U.S. at 238) (emphasis supplied by Judge
Cudahy).
238. See id. at 639. The majority’s reading of Compco as a Supremacy Clause case appears to be in
error, as Compco’s holding was grounded in the Patent Clause. See Davis Jr., supra note 13, at 610-12
(noting that the Compco decision makes “no reference whatsoever” to the Supremacy Clause, and that it
“instead expressly rested the outcome on the Supremacy Clause’s far more obscure cousin, the [Patent]
Clause”).
239. See id. at 639-40.
240. See id. at 641 (quoting language from Bonito Boats that references permissible limited
regulations on the use of product designs to prevent consumer confusion).
241. See id. at 646-47 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy is not alone in this assertion:
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[T]he conflict that the Court found between state law and federal patent
law as a prerequisite to preemption in Sears, Compco and Bonito Boats is
exactly the same conflict as would develop between federal patent law and
federal trademark law if a design patent could be made perpetual by
trademarking the design. As a matter of commercial reality, therefore, the
relation of patent law to state unfair competition law is exactly the same
as its relation to federal trademark law. 242

Judge Cudahy also did not see the Compco reference to the availability of
“other federal statutory protection” for designs as precluding the possibility
of a conflict between design patent protection and product design trade dress
protection. He argued that the phrase
does not create an exception to the constitutional policy consistently
pronounced in Compco, Sears and the cases we have discussed. Although
the use of the phrase recognizes the possibility of further congressional
action, it does not preclude conflicts between such statutes and the
constitution. 243

Judge Cudahy also noted that the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the
principles of Sears and Compco in Bonito Boats does not include “any such
blanket reference to a federal exemption.”244
Finally, with respect to the language in Bonito Boats that allegedly
authorizes state regulation of product designs and other trade dress, Judge
Cudahy recognized that the Supreme Court had stated that, although states
can pass laws intended to prevent consumer confusion, states’ authority to
do so is limited:
[T]he majority opinion here seems to read into Bonito Boats’ careful
discussion of permissible state laws an exemption for any state or federal
law dealing with trademarks or trade dress. But the Court only
acknowledged that states could continue to enact unfair competition laws
[C]ritics contend that trade dress laws should still be preempted because these laws are “merely
federalized” state common law for trademarks and unfair competition. One of the most compelling
arguments for the impermissibility of the interaction between the two acts is the extension of “patentlike” protection after the expiration of a utility or design patent by the use of trade dress law. Further, the
two acts allow a product design to obtain indefinite trade dress protection without secondary meaning,
resulting in a lack of assurance of the trade dress as a source indicator and circumvention of patent law.
Bonder, supra note 40, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
242. Id. at 647.
243. Id. at 646 n.2 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Although Judge Cudahy
recognizes that the phrase “other federal statutory protection” is often used to justify application of the
Lanham Act to product designs, he does not state one other potential explanation for this phrase—namely,
that the phrase may refer to copyright protection for product designs. Indeed, interpreting the phrase as
a reference to the federal copyright statute creates a certain internal harmony within the context in which
it appears. The court in Compco begins by stating that the federal policy embodied in the Patent Clause
permits free copying of “whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.” 376
U.S. at 237. It concludes with the thought that “if the design is not entitled to a design patent or other
federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will.” Id. at 238. Simple parallel construction leads
to the conclusion that the second statement also refers to copyright. This conclusion is somewhat
reinforced when one considers that intervening discussion identifies no other federal statutory protection
that might be implicated, and in fact gives short shrift to the lower court’s finding that the product design
“had, like a trademark, acquired a ‘secondary meaning.’” Id. Indeed, an interpretation that can be drawn
from this language is that evidence of secondary meaning (or evidence that the design would be entitled
to trademark protection) is not sufficient to overcome the federal right to copy.
244. Id.
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so long as, and to the extent that, they did not conflict with the federal
policy embodied in Sears/Compco. 245

Such limited regulations might include, as suggested by Sears, a requirement
for labeling of the products to prevent consumer confusion. 246
In concluding his analysis, Judge Cudahy again “grounded” his position
on constitutional concerns:
If the issue before us is a conflict between a well-defined statutory scheme
(the design patent laws) enacted under a specific and limited constitutional
directive (the Patent Clause) and a judicial doctrine (protection of product
configurations as trademarks) only remotely incident to a general statutory
scheme (the Lanham Act), the specific, constitutionally-mandated
provisions should control. 247

As was the case with the constitutional right to copy issue, the majority failed
to address this issue in its opinion. 248
A third appellate case that deserves attention is Ashley Furniture, 249 in
which the Fourth Circuit similarly determined that, “traditional trade dress
protection for product configuration will not undermine either utility or

245. Id.
246. See 376 U.S. at 232.
247. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 651 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
248. Commentators have applauded Judge Cudahy’s Kohler dissent. See, e.g., Katherine J.
Strandburg, Rounding the Corner on Trade Dress, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 387, 378-388 (2012), explaining
that, “Judge Cudahy penned a well-known dissent [in Kohler], later described by commentators as
‘spirited,’ ‘elegant,’ and ‘forceful.’” (internal citations omitted). Further explaining how “recent Supreme
Court cases suggest that Judge Cudahy got it right.” See also Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse
Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
79, 145 n.287 (2004) (in his “now famous dissent,” Judge Cudahy correctly declared that utility patents
and design patents required the same treatment regarding functionality); David W. Opderbeck, An
Economic Perspective on Product Configuration Trade Dress, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 347-48
(2000), explaining that:
Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Kohler elegantly illustrates the dichotomy of views concerning
trade dress protection for product configurations… According to Judge Cudahy, a central theme
of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence is the public’s right to copy a non-patented design. In
contrast to the majority’s exegesis of Compco, Judge Cudahy’s dissent emphasized the
Supreme Court’s discussion of the Constitutional mandate that whatever is unprotected by
patent and copyright may be freely copied. According to Judge Cudahy, this policy was
reinforced in Bonito Boats, where the Court recognized that for nearly a century, patent has
incorporated a public right to copy and use an article after the patent protection has been
exhausted. Judge Cudahy was not concerned that the Sears-Compco cases dealt with
preemption of state unfair competition law. Because the Lanham Act federalized state unfair
competition law, there is a conflict between “a federal statutory scheme rooted in the
Constitution and a federal codification of the common law.” Under these circumstances, the
explicit constitutionally-proscribed requirement should control (emphasis added). Id.
Opderbeck further explains:
Judge Cudahy did not accept the standard response that the functionality doctrine resolves this
conflict. He likened a truly “functional” product feature to one that could be protected by a
utility patent. An ornamental feature, however, might be protected by a design patent, not a
utility patent. Since design patents may protect ornamental designs regardless of whether they
are “essential for competition,” a product configuration that was the subject of an expired
design patent may nevertheless be protected from copying under the Lanham Act. In
Judge Cudahy’s view, this would permit a producer to obtain a monopoly on an essentially
generic form outside the patent laws’ boundaries. Judge Cudahy therefore would not have
extended trade dress protection to product configurations. Id. at 348.
249. 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999). In this regard, another appellate case worth noting is Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998).

130

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION

VOL 21:1

design patent law.” 250 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had copied one of the plaintiff’s designs for a bedroom suite, in violation of
federal trade dress law. 251 In passing, the majority confronted the notion that
one “justification for heightening trade dress requirements in product
configuration cases is the perceived need to protect the boundaries between
trade dress, copyright, and patent law.” 252 In rejecting this notion, the court
downplayed any potential conflict between the two forms of protection,
stating, “the trade dress rule that functional aspects of a product, although
patentable, are not protectable as trade dress directly eliminates any conflict
between patents for useful items and trade dress protection for product
configuration.” 253
Critically, the majority opinions in these aforementioned decisions fail
to contain any significant analysis of the potential constitutional conflict
between design patent protection and protection of product design trade
dress. The Mogen David opinion only contains one reference to Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution, and that is found in a quotation from another
case, which the court summarily dismissed, stating, “[we]…see no reason to
consider appellant’s patents except to the extent they may contain evidence
of the functionality of the outline shape sought to be registered as a
trademark.” 254 The court’s simplistic mantra was merely that trademark
rights exist independently of design patent rights, “under different law and
for different reasons.” 255 Finally, in many of these cases, courts have
referenced the doctrine of functionality as the safeguard that precludes a
conflict between patent and trade dress protection. 256 However, the
traditional functionality doctrine serves only to obviate a conflict with
utilitarian features contained in a utility patent; it does nothing to resolve any
potential conflicts between trade dress protection for ornamental product
designs and design patent protection. Judge Posner—as early as 1995—
expressly noted the limitations of the functionality doctrine when he wrote:

250. 187 F.3d at 376.
251. Id. at 366.
252. Id. at 376.
253. Id. The court further reasons:
[P]ermitting such trade dress protection would not impermissibly give the trade dress plaintiff
a perpetual design patent… Trade dress rights do, of course, persist indefinitely, while design
patents provide only 14 years of protection. But the trade dress plaintiff must establish
likelihood of customer confusion in order to be protected at all “which the design patent owner
need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency between the two modes of
protection.” Moreover, “compared to patent protection, trademark protection is relatively weak
because it precludes competitors only from using marks that are likely to confuse or deceive
the public.” It should also be noted that trade dress rights, although of indefinite duration, are
not necessarily perpetual. Such rights terminate if the trade dress is abandoned, or if the trade
dress becomes generic through public usage…A current design patent, by contrast, would
continue to provide protection regardless of such eventualities. Id. (internal citations omitted).
254. See 328 F.2d at 931.
255. Id. at 930.
256. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
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[P]rovided that a defense of functionality is recognized, there is no conflict
with federal patent law, save possibly with 35 U.S.C. § 171, which allows
a 14-year patent to be granted for a nonfunctional ornamental design — a
design patent. 257

In summary, the most well-developed constitutional discussion of this
issue comes in the Kohler decision—however, the substance is found in the
dissenting opinion by Judge Cudahy, not in the majority opinion that held
there was no conflict. 258 Judge Cudahy found that allowing trade dress
protection for product designs conflicts with the “right to copy” inherent in
the Patent Clause and recognized by the Supreme Court for more than a
hundred years. 259 He concluded that, at a fundamental level, protecting
product design as trade dress is an unconstitutional violation of the Patent
Clause. 260
To reach this conclusion, Judge Cudahy referenced a number of older
Supreme Court cases, including Scott Paper, Kellogg, and Singer. The heart
of his constitutional objection, however, appears to be rooted in this language
from the Compco decision:
To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent…laws leave in
the public domain. Here [Plaintiff’s] fixture has been held not to be
entitled to a design or mechanical patent. Under the federal patent laws it
is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied in every detail by
whoever pleases. It is true that the trial court found that the configuration
of [Plaintiff’s] fixture identified [Plaintiff] to the trade because the
arrangement of the ribbing had, like a trademark, acquired a “secondary
meaning” by which that particular design was associated with [Plaintiff].
But if the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory
protection, then it can be copied at will. 261

He viewed the Supreme Court’s later Bonito Boats decision as
reaffirming this principle.262 The clear focus of Judge Cudahy’s concern is
the right to copy or freedom to copy a product design that is not protected by
patent (or copyright):
What is at stake here is the right to copy the thing itself — that is, to copy
its configuration or design. The configuration or design of a product is as
generic as the name of the product. As the Supreme Court cases
demonstrate, the constitutional right to copy after a patent expires or in the
absence of a patent is the reciprocal of the constitutional right to prohibit
copying for a limited term under the Patent Clause. To ignore this

257. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
258. The majority summarily disposed of Kohler’s constitutional arguments, holding that, “[i]n sum,
courts have consistently held that a product’s different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or
successively, by more than one of the statutory means for protection of intellectual property.” Kohler, 12
F.3d at 638.
259. See id. at 644 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
260. See id.
261. 12 F.3d at 646 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting Compco; emphasis in the original).
262. See id.
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principle is to permit perpetual monopolies on product ideas or particular
product designs and to inhibit product development. 263

IX. THE SUPREME COURT’S 21ST CENTURY TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., decided in 2000, the Court determined that in
a civil action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act for infringement of
unregistered trade dress, product configuration trade dress will be deemed
distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary
meaning. 264 In Wal-Mart, the plaintiff designed and sold children’s clothes,
which the defendant copied with only minor changes. 265 The issue for the
Court to decide can be summarized as, under what circumstances is a senior
product’s design distinctive, and therefore protectible, in an action for
infringement of unregistered trade dress? 266 In answering that question, the
Court held that, “in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and
therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.” 267 In so
holding, the Court was forced to confront its previous holding in Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 268 which had been decided only eight years
prior. 269 The holding in Two Pesos amalgamated the two types of trade
dress, package and design, saying they were to be treated the same. 270 The
Court in Wal-Mart judicially side-stepped 271 its previous holding in Two
Pesos by attempting to carefully differentiate the two types of trade dress
and then treat them separately and significantly differently. In any event, the
practical effect of Wal-Mart created a catch-22 for practitioners, as
succinctly summarized by one commentator:
[W]hat will a [product owner] do if it believes that its device has sourceidentifying product configuration trade dress but it does not wish to risk
263. Id. at 647 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
264. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216.
265. Id. at 207.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 216.
268. 505 U. S. 763 (1992).
269. The respondent in Wal-Mart asserted that the Court’s decision in Two Pesos forecloses a
conclusion that product-design trade dress can never be inherently distinctive. Id. at 214. In response,
the Court explained:
In that case, we held that the trade dress of a chain of Mexican restaurants, which the plaintiff
described as “a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with
artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals,” 505 U. S., at 765 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), could be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning,
see id., at 776. Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal principle that trade dress can be
inherently distinctive, see, e. g., id., at 773, but it does not establish that product-design trade
dress can be. Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade dress at issue, the
decor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product design. It was either product
packaging—which, as we have discussed, normally is taken by the consumer to indicate
origin—or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the
present case. Id. at 214-15.
270. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775-76.
271. It is the opinion of the authors that the Court silently overruled Two-Pesos through its opinion
in Wal-Mart.
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losing that source-identifying significance in a race to secondary meaning
in the market with potential competitors? 272

This commentator answered this question by explaining, simply:

The [product owner] will elect to file a design patent application that
claims the nonfunctional, ornamental features of the product configuration
trade dress of the device. The [product owner] will then have the 14-year
term of the design patent within which to claim exclusive rights to use the
product configuration trade dress in the market, thereby preventing any
competitors from entering the race to secondary meaning using the patent
laws as an enforcement sword. 273

One year after the Wal-Mart decision, the Court in TrafFix signaled a
first step toward considering the conflict between the Patent Clause and trade
dress protection provided pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In TrafFix, the
Court was presented with a claim for trade dress infringement based on a
copied design that had been the subject of an expired utility patent. 274 Instead
of considering the right to copy, the Court based its holding on
functionality. 275 Specifically, the Court held that an expired utility patent
covering the design claimed to be covered by trade dress “adds great weight
to the statutory presumption” that the design is functional and not protectable
by trade dress. 276 However, its final paragraph came as close as the Supreme
Court has come in recent times to confronting directly the issue of a potential
conflict between the limited times protection available for patents and the
potentially unlimited protection available for product design trade dress. The
Court opted not to decide the patent-related trade dress issue and, instead,
based its decision on the functionality doctrine, which originally had been
fashioned entirely by lower courts, which only years later was codified in the
U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act. 277 Significantly, the TrafFix decision
provided little or no guidance on how to handle the question of whether
features claimed in an expired design patent could thereafter be protected as
trade dress, thereby arguably extending the design patent from a type of
protection offered for limited times to one of potentially limitless duration.
Although the Court disposed of the issue on the basis of the doctrine of
functionality, it went out of its way to highlight:
[Defendant] and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of the
Constitution of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility
patent from claiming trade dress protection. We need not resolve this
question. If, despite the rule that functional features may not be the subject
272. Browning, supra note 208, at 1059.
273. Id.
274. See 532 U.S. 23, 25-26.
275. Id. at 32.
276. Id. at 29-30.
277. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964)). The court in Mogen David noted: “We know of
no provision of patent law, statutory or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the
subject matter of any expired patent. Patent expiration is nothing more than the cessation of the patentee’s
right to exclude under the patent law.” 328 F.2d at 930. See also Lanham Act, §33(b)(8), 15 U.S.C.A.
§1052(e)(5) (2021).
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of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the
practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough
to consider the matter. 278

This statement provides no definitive answer to the underlying
constitutional issue; rather, the Court is simply noting that the issue is one
that likely will need to be confronted in the future. 279
In 2003, in the wake of the Wal-Mart and TrafFix decisions, the
Supreme Court chose to decide Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. 280 This case involved the unique circumstance of copying and
distributing, totally without attribution, expired copyrighted content, and
queried whether § 43(a) of the Lanham Act prevents such use of this work. 281
In reversing the Ninth Circuit and holding for the Defendant, the Court
decided that “origin” (in the phrase “false designation of origin” in Section
43(a)) does not include the creator of the copied underlying work. 282 The
Court refused to read “43(a)… as creating a cause of action for, in effect,
plagiarism - the use of otherwise unprotected works and inventions without
attribution … .” 283 Implicit in the Court’s ruling was a questioning, if not a
stoppage, of the historical judicial expansion of § 43(a). The Court
emphasized that “§43(a) ‘does not have boundless application as a remedy
for unfair trade practices.’” 284 Although the framed issue, and its analysis,
looks like a strict and technical matter of defining the word “origin” in the
“false designation of origin” phrase, the opinion contained a sweeping and
important statement about the nature of trademark protection and its
relationship to broad copyright (and patent) policy:
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in
accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations (which were not
designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright
and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods…
To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that 43(a) created a species of
perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. 285

As explained by one commentator, through this decision the Court
appears to have been backtracking to “build on its earlier struggles with
issues of federal preemption in an attempt to both limit and redefine the role
of trademark protection and to create brighter lines of demarcation between
278. Id. at 35. It is notable that the granted writ of certiorari included “the issue whether the existence
of an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the patentee’s claiming trade dress protection in
the product’s design.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). As such, the entire Supreme Court
orientation concerned utility patents, not design patents.
279. Id. at 35.
280. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
281. Id. at 25.
282. See 539 U.S. at 36.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 29.
285. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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trademark and other aspects of intellectual property law.” 286 It should be
noted that in 2004—shortly after the Supreme Court’s decisions in WalMart, 287 TrafFix, 288 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 289 and Dastar 290—
Professor Welkowitz analyzed the Court’s sea-changed attitudes toward the
relationship between trademark law, on the one hand, and patent and
copyright laws, on the other hand. He cogently explained:
The Supreme Court’s four trademark opinions this millennium have three
critical factors in common: … (iii) all four decisions took a narrow view
of the protective umbrella afforded by the trademark laws. The clarity of
these results is striking—obviously, the Court is sending a message. One
part of the message is clear: the Court is unhappy with the expansive view
of trademark protection put forth by many lower courts. This unhappiness
appears to stem from the Court’s conviction that trademark law remains
an offshoot of unfair competition rather than a subset of intellectual
property law. 291
[T]he Court’s trademark case in 2000—Wal-Mart—represents a fairly
clear break from the bulk of the Court’s late twentieth century trademark
jurisprudence. It also marks a clear beginning of a jurisprudence that
harkens back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its
discomfort with the treatment of trademarks as a species of intellectual
property. 292
As if to make clear that trademark law is different from copyright and
patent, the Court noted that those doctrines would permit protection for
many product designs, and ameliorate the consequences of its decision. In
other words, the message to trademark owners is, if you want intellectual
property protection, use “real” intellectual property doctrines, not
trademark law. 293

And finally, “Ordinary trademark law is grounded in unfair competition and
consumer protection, not intellectual property.” 294
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court significantly curtailed use of the
Lanham Act to prevent product design approximations. 295 The Court’s
opinion in TrafFix substantially furthers that undertaking. Whereas the
Court explicitly avoided the right to copy issue, the Court clarified that the
286. Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix, Moseley, and Dastar
– The Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 237, 259 (2005).
287. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).
288. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
289. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). Moseley is a leading authority on trademark dilution which, unlike
traditional trademark infringement claims, does not require any showing of likelihood of confusion.
According to Welkowitz, “like Wal-Mart and TrafFix, Moseley presented the Court with an issue of the
extent of trademark protection in a new and different form from that found in traditional cases.”
Welkowitz, supra note 158, at 1681-82. Welkowitz further explained, “[t]he Court again emphasized the
consumer protection and unfair competition roots of trademark law and took a narrow view of trademark
protection, the scope of which is more akin to a property right than to consumer protection.” Id. at 1684.
290. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
291. Welkowitz, supra note 158, at 1660.
292. Id. at 1676 (footnotes omitted).
293. Id. at 1678-79.
294. Id. at 1683.
295. See 529 U.S. at 213.
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time to consider the matter will be a case “in which trade dress becomes the
practical equivalent of an expired utility patent.” 296
That said, years earlier, the Court arguably had acknowledged that both
types of protection may be available for the same design (whether
simultaneously or sequentially) without conflict. 297 In Bonito Boats, for
example, the Court stopped short of holding that its prior Sears and Compco
decisions precluded any state regulation of items that fall within the broad
scope of patentable subject matter, noting that the Sears decision expressly
left open the possibility that trademark and other unfair competition laws can
be used to protect trade dress—identified as “potentially the subject matter
of design patents”—so as to prevent purchasers from being misled as to the
source of goods. 298 But this was oblique. Although the Wal-Mart Court
noted that a manufacturer could obtain protection for a product design that
had not yet obtained secondary meaning by securing a design patent or
copyright, the Court fell short of saying that the two types of protection could
coexist without conflict. 299 Indeed, that Court further failed to make mention
of patent law’s specific statutory scheme rooted in the Constitution and the
Constitutional conflict that would result from allowing dual protection for
product design. 300
The language in Bonito Boats and Wal-Mart hardly seems to close the
door on the matter, at least not in the eyes of the Supreme Court. Certainly,
the Court’s concluding paragraph in TrafFix—written twelve years after
Bonito Boats and one year after Wal-Mart—provides strong evidence that
the Court considered the issue unresolved.
The simple fact is that, although the language in these cases points to
the possibility of overlapping protection, it stops far short of holding that
both types of protection actually are available. Careful reading of the
opinions raises questions about the intended scope of the relevant statements.
First, there is some question as to whether the language in Bonito Boats
applies to matter for which a patent actually has been obtained. To use the
words of the Court, the language of Sears that authorizes states to place some
conditions on the use of trade dress gives rise to “an implicit recognition that
all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter is
not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws.” 301 The reference to
“unpatented subject matter” may imply that no such conditions can be placed
on patentable subject matter for which a patent was, in fact, not obtained.
More importantly, just as Bonito Boats stopped short of saying that
trademark protection never can be extended to patentable subject matter, that
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 35.
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
See 489 U.S. at 154.
See 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
See id.
489 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
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case also does not state that full trademark protection should be afforded to
patentable subject matter. The Court merely stated that “limited regulations”
and/or “some conditions” can be placed on the use of patentable designs “in
order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.” 302 Further, the Court
explained that “we have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and
Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the protection of a
valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint.” 303
Phrases such as “limited regulations” and “without significant restraint” do
not appear to equate with full trademark protection. More suitable as a
“limited regulation” is the example given by the Court in Sears, namely, that
manufacturers be required to label their products to prevent consumer
confusion. 304
Indeed, other language in Bonito Boats suggests that there are strict and
narrow bounds to the restrictions that can be placed legally on the use of
patentable subject matter. For example, the Court identified, as a matter of
federal policy, a “federal right to ‘copy and use’” the subject matter of an
expired patent. 305 Further, the Court indicated that a law that protects a
formerly-patented product from copying undermines the entire patent
system:
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an
unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely
disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the
ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of
federal patent policy. 306

Although this language expressly refers to state law, the reasoning of
the Court—including the underlying principle that publicly-known ideas
“are the tools of creation available to all” —would appear to be equally
applicable to any federal law that “substantially interferes” with the use of a
utilitarian or design concept disclosed through a patent. 307
Finally, it should be noted that in discussing trademarks and trade dress,
the Bonito Boats Court spoke in terms of “trademarks, labels, or distinctive
trade dress in the packaging of goods.” 308 Not mentioned is product design
trade dress. Although protection for product design was not unheard of in
1989, it apparently did not gain real momentum until the 1990’s. 309 Hence,
302. 489 U.S. at 154 & 165.
303. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
304. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 232 (1964).
305. See 489 U.S. at 165.
306. Id. at 156-57.
307. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting
that “the Lanham Act must be construed in the light of a strong federal policy in favor of vigorously
competitive markets,” and finding Sears and Compco relevant even if their preemption analysis does not
strictly apply to the Lanham Act).
308. 489 U.S. at 154.
309. See generally Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2000) (explaining that
“in recent years [the concept of trade dress] has been expanded by many courts of appeals to encompass
the design of a product”).
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there is some question as to whether the statements in Bonito Boats would
apply equally to product design trade dress claims. 310
The discussion in Wal-Mart regarding the possibility of obtaining a
design patent also falls short of saying that the two types of protection can
coexist without conflict. There the Court did not expressly rule that both
could simultaneously coexist for the same feature 311—it merely noted that
the availability of other protections, such as design patent protection, reduces
the harm that might result from the imposition of a requirement that a party
only can claim trademark rights in a product design once secondary meaning
has been established. 312 As discussed above, earlier Supreme Court
decisions arguably could be said to have provided a clear answer on this
subject, at least in cases where an expired patent is involved. 313 However,
while Singer, Kellogg, and Scott Paper all appear to foreclose the possibility
of using other forms of protection for patentable subject matter—or at least
for subject matter that actually had been protected by a patent—more recent
decisions are less clear on the subject. Sears/Compco, Bonito Boats, and
TrafFix all presented the Court with the opportunity to build upon the
foundation laid by these earlier cases and simply hold that federal patent
protection is the only available protection for patentable subject matter.
None of these decisions reached that holding, however. Instead, in each
instance, the Court applied a non-constitutional rationale and relied upon a
different basis to resolve the case before it.
X. 21ST CENTURY APPROACH OF THE LOWER COURTS
It should be noted that a number of lower court cases following the WalMart, TrafFix, and Dastar decisions have concluded that the same feature
can simultaneously or sequentially be protected under some combination of
the patent and trademark and/or copyright laws. 314 This, indeed, is, and
continues to be, the traditional, protectionist view. Notably, although most
310. Cf. id. at 212-15 (providing reasons for treating product design trade dress differently from
product packaging trade dress). Indeed, the Court in Wal-Mart clearly differentiated between these two
types of trade dress, concluding that one (product packaging) can be inherently distinctive whereas the
other (product design) cannot, and the default is product design (to protect copying). See id. at 215.
Compare this restrictive approach of Wal-Mart with Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
(1992), which was much more expansive.
311. In fairness, however, the Court did state, without any words of disapproval, that the plaintiff had
obtained design patent protection covering “certain elements” of its claimed trade dress. See 529 U.S. at
214.
312. See id. at 214.
313. See supra, section I.
314. See RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that
“trademark and copyright protection may coexist”); Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1244 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“Parallel claims under the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, however, are not
per se impermissible.”); Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45385 at *11 (N.D.
Cal., May 10, 2010) (same); Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Granite Precasting & Concrete, Inc., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53775 at *8 (W.D. Wash., June 1, 2010) (same); Solo Cup Operating Corp. v. Lollicup USA,
Inc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132193 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (constitutional question raised and noted, but then
summarily set aside, as avoided by non-functionality).
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of the 21st Century decisions are district court cases—which only
perfunctorily espouse this position—there are new appellate cases that
totally blithely assume that trade dress and patent (and/or copyright) claims
can coexist. 315
In a recent opinion, Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Dolgencorp LLC, 316 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment holding in favor of the
defendant on the plaintiff’s claims for design patent infringement, copyright
infringement, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition. The plaintiff
made a “Chalk Pencil” and filed suit against the defendant, a competitor, for
selling a similar looking product to the plaintiff’s former distributor and
retailer. The court viewed each issue in the case as a separate matter
warranting a separate analysis, and disposed of each issue individually. In
so doing, the court carelessly and casually assumed that the overlap of each
cause of action (e.g., trade dress infringement and design patent
infringement) was noncontroversial. There was no mention of any possible
conflict—constitutional or otherwise. 317
Another “traditional” appellate case is Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay
Int’l, Inc. 318 In this case, the plaintiff, creator of particular product designs,
acquired four utility patents, seven design patents and three trademark
registrations. Plaintiff first protected its product design by design patents, 319
but as they began to expire, plaintiff sought to register its product designs as
trademarks. Three of these were registered eventually. 320 Later, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s cancellation of these registrations on the
basis of functionality. 321 In its opinion, the appellate court observed that the
plaintiff was attempting to extend its patent monopoly through trademark
law by obtaining trademark protection for the same configuration that had
been protected under its now-expired utility patents. 322 Significantly, the
court noted in passing that “[t]he existence of [a] design patent does not
preclude the same product from protection as a trademark under the Lanham
Act either simultaneously or successively.” 323
315. See, e.g., Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Dolgencorp LLC, 958 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Craft Smith,
LLC v. EC Design, LLC, 969 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 2020).
316. 958 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
317. In an analogous case—involving the interface between copyright and trade dress instead of the
design patent and trade dress interface—the Tenth Circuit analyzed both copyright infringement and trade
dress infringement for the same product without any mention of possible conflict, constitutional or
otherwise, between the two types of protection. See Craft Smith, 969 F.3d 1092.
318. 461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006).
319. Id. at 679.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 690.
322. See id. at 689.
323. Id. at 683 (citing to Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that a
trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection and must also prove secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion in an infringement suit, which the owner of a design patent need not do).
However, in making this assertion, the Fuji court totally ignored Cudahy’s dissent in Kohler). Separately,
the court added that “[a] design patent, counter to a utility patent, is presumptive evidence of
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However, in Groeneveld, decided by the same court a few years later,
the Sixth Circuit rejected this view, took a policy-based approach, and stated,
“trademark law is designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate
product manufacturers from lawful competition.” 324 Indeed, the Groeneveld
court starkly contrasted the property-based protections derived from the
Patent Clause from the deceit-based protection based on unfair competition
principles, stating:
The clear import of the twin principles that copying in the absence of
copyright or patent protection often serves useful purposes, and that the
concern of trademark law is not about copying per se but about copying
that engenders consumer confusion, is that the appropriate “intent” to
focus on is not the intent to copy but rather the intent
to deceive or confuse. 325

Other courts have rejected this majority view. For example, the Seventh
Circuit, in Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 326 noted that, “many cases say
that fashionable designs can be freely copied unless protected by patent
law,” 327 and, in holding for the defendant, proclaimed:
Franek chose to pursue a trademark, not a design patent, to protect the
stylish circularity of his beach towel. Cf. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d
632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting)… He must live with that
choice. We cannot permit him to keep the indefinite competitive
advantage in producing beach towels this trademark creates. 328

To this end, the courts that have held that multiple types of intellectual
property protection can be combined generally note that trademark
protection is concerned with interests materially different from patent or
copyright protection, and they note that proof of trademark infringement
involves considerations (such as proof of likelihood of confusion) that are
not required in copyright or patent cases. 329 However, the appropriateness
and ability of these additional considerations to avoid a conflict is seriously
subject to question.

nonfunctionality.” Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683. The court mainly
focused on functionality of the product designs resulting from the expired utility patents and
advertisement materials. Id. at 684-90. In this regard, it seems that the court could not find an appropriate
test to analyze “non-functionality” due to conflicting presumptions. Id. at 684. If there had been an apt
test for “non-functionality,” the court would have been better equipped to analyze the non-functionality
issues resulting from the expired design patents.
324. See Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir.
2013).
325. Id. at 514.
326. 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010).
327. Id. at 860 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 109 S. Ct. 971,
103 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S. Ct. 784, 11 L. Ed. 2d
661, 1964 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 425 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 S.
Ct. 779, 11 L. Ed. 2d 669, 1964 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 421 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed. 73, 1939 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 850 (1938); Singer Manufacturing Co. v.
June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 16 S. Ct. 1002, 41 L. Ed. 118, 1896 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 687
(1896)).
328. 615 F.3d at 861. There was no mention of any possible conflict—constitutional or otherwise.
329. See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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XI. WHAT DO ACADEMICS THINK?
The three most recent—all post-2003—and most focused and in-depth
scholarly treatments of the constitutional conflict are articles published by
Professor Aaron Perzanowski, 330 Professor Jeanne Fromer 331 and longtime
former Permanent Sixth Circuit Legal Advisor Wayne Kalkwarf, in 2008,
2012, and 2014, respectively. Each of these articles deserves detailed
explication. First, Perzanowski.
According to Perzanowski, the simple fact is that the Constitution
provides two separate and distinct grants of authority that give rise to the
possibility of at least two types of simultaneous or sequential intellectual
property protection being available for the same product design feature. A
non-utilitarian product design may be protectable under design patent law
under the grant of authority in the Patent Clause (and possibly under
copyright law). And, it arguably also may be protectable under trademark
law as product design trade dress under the general authority of the
Commerce Clause. 332 It has been noted that the Commerce Clause power,
as it is understood today, would enable Congress to enact a variety of laws
that have traditionally been enacted pursuant to other grants of power.333 But
does Perzanowski endorse such duplicative protection as constitutionally
acceptable? He explains that commentators have identified two theories that
inform our ability to identify whether a conflict exists between two different
constitutional provisions:
First, because the legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution are
cumulative, “what cannot be done under one of them may very well be
doable under another.” Second, and equally true, Congress may not
circumvent the limits imposed by one provision of the Constitution simply
by acting under another grant of authority. 334

At first glance, these two principles appear to be at odds. One places
limits on Congress’ power, while the other denies those limits. The conflict
330. Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on QuasiCopyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081 (2008).
331. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329
(2012).
332. This is the position taken by the courts in cases such as Ashley Furniture Indus. v. Sangiacomo
N.A., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991); and In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (all
holding that both patent protection and trade dress protection can coexist for the same product features).
333. But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
that the broad reach of the modern Commerce Clause power could easily encroach on other specific grants
of constitutional power).
334. Perzanowski, supra note 330, at 1088 (citations omitted); see also Andrew M. Hetherington,
Constitutional Purpose and Inter-clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the
Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2003) (noting that “the prevailing
view among legal academics is… that Congress may not ignore the restrictions on its power contained in
one clause merely by legislating under another clause,” but also recognizing that some courts have
concluded that “as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches beyond the limits of one grant of
legislative power has no bearing on whether it can be sustained under another” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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only exists when each is considered separately. However, read carefully and
in conjunction with one another, the two merge to provide the basic principle
for Constitutional analysis. As explained by Perzanowski:
In isolation, neither fully accounts for the complex interactions between
the provisions of [the Constitution], but taken together, they explain that
Congress is free to legislate under any sufficient constitutional grant, so
long as it does not contravene applicable limitations elsewhere in the
Constitution. 335

He does note, however, that “determining whether a limit constrains
other grants of authority is not always an easy task.” 336 As explained by
Malla Pollack, “[t]he constitutional phrase ‘limited times’ should be
interpreted to mean that Congress’ exclusive grants to authors and inventors
must be temporally finite.” 337 Thus, “although Congress has passed
intellectual property statutes by relying on the Commerce Clause, none of
these statutes attempts to bypass the ‘limited times’ provision.” 338 Pollack
concluded by stating that, “[no commentator] has suggested a theory that
allows Congress to bypass the ‘limited times’ provision.” 339
The basic principle espoused here—that a conflict exists where
legislation clashes with the objectives or the limitations imposed by other
applicable law—is essentially the same principle that underlies Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence. Under the Supremacy Clause, if a particular state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the “full purposes and
objectives” of federal law, the two are in conflict, and the state law is
preempted. 340 Analogously, in cases of potential inter-Clause conflict, if a
particular law enacted pursuant to one grant of authority stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the “purposes and objectives” of another grant, the
two are in conflict. 341 The only practical difference between cases involving
the Supremacy Clause and cases involving inter-Clause conflicts is the
difficulty in determining which law prevails. In Supremacy Clause cases, a
clear hierarchy exists and informs that, in cases of a conflict between federal
and state laws, federal law prevails.342 No such hierarchy exists in terms of
the various Clauses of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. Each Clause
stands alongside the other as a separate and alternative grant of congressional
power. 343
335. Perzanowski, supra note 330, at 1088.
336. Perzanowski admits his article is aimed at “the copyright power of Clause 8, but the general
principles and some of the limits addressed are equally applicable to the patent power.” Id. at 1082, n. 4.
Although the focus of the present article is on (design) patents, it is understood that the principles
discussed herein also applies to copyrights, since they both come from the Patent and Copyright Clause.
337. Pollack, supra note 64, at 287.
338. Id. at 288, apparently intending “intellectual property” to refer to “patent and copyright”—
incorrectly, as explained supra note 13.
339. Id. at 289.
340. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1974).
341. See Hetherington, supra note 333, at 500.
342. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
343. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Although the Supreme Court cases on inter-Clause conflicts do not
reveal a consistent approach, Perzanowski views these cases as
demonstrating “a general receptiveness to the notion that the limits of one
enumerated power may, under appropriate circumstances, restrain Congress
from acting under an alternative source of authority.” 344 As explained by
Perzanowski:
The rule against superfluity must be applied any time the Commerce
Clause would provide Congress with authority denied by other
enumerated powers…. Where Congress uses the Commerce Clause to
eliminate or ignore a limit within another enumerated power, that limit
must be applied externally, and the commerce power must yield. 345

To this end, patent protection arguably is within the reach of the
expansive Commerce Power.346 Hence, in order to avoid rendering the
Patent Clause superfluous, the limitations of the Patent Clause must apply to
exercises of the Commerce Clause power that concern patentable subject
matter. 347
Now, turning to Fromer. At the beginning of her lengthy and
multifaceted constitutional examination—most of the details of which are
well beyond the scope of the current article—and shortly after dissing the
terms “Intellectual Property Clause” and “IP Clause” as “inaccurate in at
least two ways,” 348 she set forth the nature of her inquiry and examination,
coupled with her detailed conclusion, in these terms:
This Article relies on the text, structure, and history of the IP Clause, as
well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme Court doctrine, and
policy, to show that the IP Clause operates to forbid Congress from using
its other powers “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
through laws that reach beyond the scope of the IP Clause’s prescription
to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” This evidence shows
that if Congress seeks, via legislation, to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, the only way it can do so is by enacting laws that secure
to authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries
for limited times…
If the structural purpose of a law is to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, the law may use only the means specified in the IP Clause to
pursue that purpose. This understanding of external limitations imposed
by the IP Clause yields varying collisions with other constitutional
provisions, primarily the Commerce… powers. To evaluate laws that have
multiple constitutional purposes, a presumption ought to exist against the
344. Perzanowski, supra note 330, at 1089.
345. Id. at 1102-03.
346. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent
Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63-64 (2000).
347. See Perzanowski, supra note 330, at 1102 (stating that “a Commerce Clause unrestrained by
external limits would empower Congress to enact legislation that disregards the limits of [the Patent
Clause] — durational or otherwise,” and that such an interpretation would not only render the Patent
Clause redundant, it would strip the Clause of all meaning).
348. Fromer, supra note 331, at 1331, n.1. To conform with common practice, she proceeds to use
“IP Clause.”
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constitutionality of laws that promote the IP Clause’s ends but subvert its
means, a presumption that may be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the IP Clause’s
means because of paramount, legitimate interests pursuant to its other
more permissive powers. This presumption ought to be extremely difficult
to overcome when a law’s means interfere with the IP Clause’s means
instead of merely diverging from the means included in the IP Clause… 349

Accordingly, Fromer specifically and carefully took issue with the
views of another professor, Thomas Nachbar, who had claimed that the
Patent Clause does not place limits on other constitutional powers. 350 She
persuasively touted the superiority of the sequentially-stated views of
Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Malla Pollack, who had concluded:
“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the
Copyright Clause, would be meaningless if Congress could evade them
simply by announcing that it was acting under some broader authority,” 351
and “[a]ccepting that Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in
one clause of the Constitution by invoking a more general clause, Congress
may not grant (at least some types of) exclusive rights to something close to,
but not quite, the writings of authors or the discoveries of
inventors.” 352 Fromer further explained:
[The Patent] Clause is structured differently from the other Article I,
Section 8 powers. It is the only clause that specifies the means for carrying
out the allotted power: “by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” The natural reading of this clause, given its unique structure,
is that Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and
useful arts using solely the specified means. 353

She continued to pound this point, relying upon early comments by Framers
such as James Madison and some 21st Century scholars. 354 Then she
concluded:
This discussion would seem strongly to establish the IP Clause’s internal
limits, but what of the ability of Congress to invoke its other powers to use
alternative means, including the rejected means? The same history seems
strongly to support the inference that the Framers intended Congress to
possess no means to promote the progress of science and useful arts other
349. Id. at 1413-14.
350. Id. at 1334 (citing Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004)); see Fromer, supra note 331, at 1334, n.12 (citing two articles by Edward
Walterscheid).
351. Id. at 1335, n.15 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information
Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 195, 230 (“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the Copyright Clause,
would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply by announcing that it was acting under some
broader authority.”)); Malla Pollack, The Right To Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the
Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 47, 60 (1999).
352. Fromer, supra note 331, at 1335 (citing Pollack, supra note 351, at 60).
353. Id. at 1339-40 (footnotes omitted).
354. See id. at 1341 n. 41-43.
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than those adopted in the IP Clause. And even stronger evidence, taken
from the earliest congressional activity, encourages the drawing of this
inference. 355

Later on, Fromer invoked the classic Trade-Mark Cases opinion, proceeding
to connect that 1879 case to the 2003 Dastar case:
The Court indicated that the IP Clause designates the means that Congress
may use – “by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” - to promote
the progress of science and useful arts. The Court observed that “the
ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery”
and that a trademark should not be understood as a “writing[]” within the
bounds of the IP Clause. 356

And this, in turn, led her to reach this conclusion:

This reasoning constructs a channeling mechanism of sorts: laws
concerned with the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts
ought to be channeled into the purview of the IP Clause and must comply
with its limiting means, and those that are not must be channeled
elsewhere, into the purview of another enumerated power. In the TradeMark Cases, the Court was called upon to deal with the latter situation. It
has not, however, been called upon to address directly the former
situation. 357

Regarding the apparently analogous treatment of the Bankruptcy Clause as
superseding the Commerce Clause in the Supreme Court’s 1982 Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons case, 358 Fromer proffered:
Although Professor Nachbar suggests that Gibbons was incorrectly
decided or should not be broadly applied to other Article I, Section 8
powers, the Court’s reasoning applies even more strongly to the IP Clause.
The historical and other evidence that the IP Clause should limit
Congress’s other enumerated powers is more robust than any evidence of
the negative implications one might draw from the uniformity requirement
of the Bankruptcy Clause. As such, the structural reasoning that the Court
employed in the bankruptcy context ought to apply even more readily to
the IP Clause to forbid Congress from evading the limited means allowed
for promoting the progress of science and useful arts by invoking another
enumerated power. 359

355. Id. at 1352.
356. Id. at 1360. In footnote 134, Fromer further explains:
The Supreme Court subsequently made a similar point in interpreting the phrase “origin of
goods” in the Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§1051-1127 (2006)), the federal implementation of the trademark laws. The Court concluded
in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), that the rights
conferred by the Lanham Act belong to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for
sale” rather than “the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods.” Id. at 37. The Court rejected the latter, broader possible interpretation because it would
“create a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.” Id.
Id. at 1360-61.
357. Id. at 1361 (footnote omitted).
358. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
359. Fromer, supra note 331, at 1365 (footnotes omitted).
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After discussing the consonance of the utilitarian nature of the Patent
Clause’s orientation with everything else she had discussed, Fromer
expounded:
The dominant policy underlying the protection of intellectual property in
the United States is utilitarian and is grounded in the IP Clause. This
utilitarian policy supplements the evidence discussed in the previous
Sections to support the idea that the IP Clause externally limits Congress’s
ability to use means other than those specified in the IP Clause to promote
the progress of science and useful arts. 360

Although late in her comprehensive article Fromer emphatically stated “The
collision between the Commerce and IP Clauses is direct,” 361 surprisingly,
the remainder of her article fails to even mention the intersection of design
patents and trade dress. Happily, another recent commentator did focus on
this matter—just two years later on.
Mr. Kalkwarf frontally-faced many relevant issues, and in doing
so made this salient statement:
The Patent/Copyright Clause authorizes patents for a limited time. Patents
may not be for perpetuity. Federal trademarks, as a creation of the
Commerce Clause, do not possess this constitutional restriction. The
limiting requirements of the Patent/Copyright Clause, as previously
examined, may not be trumped by the general provisions of the Commerce
Clause. Prior Supreme Court precedent and the rule against superfluity
both dictate that the specific time restriction of the Patent/Copyright
Clause must control any conflict between the two clauses. Any laws
passed under the Commerce Clause—in this case trademarks—must not
conflict with the limiting restrictions of the Patent/Copyright Clause, for
to do otherwise would render the Patent/Copyright Clause void. 362

His article also stated:

The ebb and flow of Supreme Court jurisprudence… establishes that the
Commerce Clause does not provide Congress absolute monarchical
authority. Rather, for Congress to properly exercise its Commerce Clause
power, the legislation must positively regulate this country’s
commerce. Further, the very language of the Commerce Clause, along
with other constitutional clauses, places affirmative limitations and
restrictions upon Congress’ power. 363

He further stated:

Because each clause has specific duties, functions, and restrictions, in the
constitutional
conflict
between
the
Commerce
and
Patent/Copyright Clauses, the rules of statutory construction and Supreme
Court precedent establish that the gluttony of commerce may not ravish
the delicate morsel of patents and copyrights. 364
360. Id. at 1366 (footnotes omitted).
361. Id. at 1380.
362. Kalkwarf, supra note 101, at 423-24. Mr. Kalkwarf, a former graduate student in one of the
senior author’s “Intro to IP” law courses, provides the most recent and comprehensive analysis of the
current conflict concern. His article, oft-referenced herein, provides considerable support for the authors’
present thesis.
363. Id. at 367 (footnotes omitted).
364. Id. at 412-13.
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He concisely asked and answered this pivotal question: “may the
Commerce Clause, with its broad authority to regulate activity that would
logically include patents and copyrights, override the restrictions imposed
by the Patent/Copyright Clause? The answer must be no.” 365 He explained
that the central theory underlying this view is the rule against superfluity,
which essentially holds that a narrative should not be interpreted so as to
render portions of its text superfluous or meaningless. 366 The rule, often
relied upon when interpreting statutes and contracts, should apply with equal
force in the context of resolving inter-Clause Constitutional conflicts: 367
Under this approach, the commerce power is free to regulate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce so long as it does not strip the
limits found in other enumerated powers of their meaning. If legislation
justified under the commerce power would effectively eliminate text
found elsewhere in the Constitution, the Commerce Clause must yield to
those external limits. 368

The Supreme Court expressly relied upon the rule against superfluity in
Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Gibbons, 369 in which it found that a law
passed—ostensibly under the authority of the Commerce Clause—to protect
the interests of former employees of a railroad company to be
unconstitutional, on the ground that it contravened the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. According to the Court, “hold[ing]
that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant
to the Commerce Clause … would eradicate from the Constitution a

365. Id. at 410.
366. In one sense, since the modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause could be
interpreted to give Congress the power to enact most, if not all, of the laws authorized by other Article I,
Section 8 clauses, this interpretation renders all of those clauses superfluous. Justice Thomas recognized
this possible view in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
However, the rule against superfluity does not preclude the possibility that Congress’s enumerated powers
may be coextensive. That is, the rule does not apply where one clause provides an alternative source of
authority for an otherwise permissible law. Only when one clause is used to circumvent—and therefore
render meaningless—a limitation contained in another clause does the rule kick in.
367. Professor William Patry has discussed this same concept in terms of respecting the overall
structure of the Constitution, stating “constitutional limitations placed on Congress by a specific clause
… serve, in at least some circumstances, to bar Congress from circumventing their application by
legislating under a different clause.” William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual
Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 376 (1999). He posited
that a statute that attempted to avoid the specific limitations of a constitutional grant would be struck
down as unconstitutional:
The rationale for the invalidation of such a statute would be structural: the Constitution sets
forth a scheme of limited powers that are intended to further specific constitutional objectives.
When Congress legislates in a manner that interferes with those objectives, it impairs the
constitutional scheme regardless of what power Congress legislates under. Id.
Professor Patry’s views are informed by the writings of Professor Laurence Tribe, who argued that both
text and structure must be considered in a constitutional analysis, as “[o]nly as an interconnected whole
do [the] provisions [of the Constitution] meaningfully constitute a frame of government.” Id. at 374
(quoting Laurence Tribe, Taking Text Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235-36 (1995)).
368. Id. at 1099-1100.
369. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
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limitation on the power of Congress.” 370 Mr. Kalkwarf analogized the
Railway case to the current constitutional issue:
The Commerce Clause allows for the regulation of activities affecting
interstate commerce, which concededly involves patents and copyrights.
However, the Patent/Copyright Clause serves as a security wall, a force
field as it were, to prohibit the Commerce Clause from encroaching upon
the limiting requirements applicable specifically to patents and
copyrights. Thus, just as Congress could not use the Commerce Clause to
violate the limiting terms of the Bankruptcy Clause, so too is Congress
prohibited from using the Commerce Clause to nullify the restrictions that
exist in the Patent/Copyright Clause. 371

In another analogous case, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 372 the Supreme Court concluded that, “[a] well
established canon of statutory interpretation succinctly captures the problem:
‘[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the
general.’” 373 Although the Supreme Court set forth this principle in the
context of the Bankruptcy Code, this principle is equally applicable to the
issue at hand. In the same context, the Court further concluded that, “[t]he
general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in
which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific
prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific
provision is construed as an exception to the general one.” 374
XII. WHAT DO PRACTITIONERS THINK?
Aside from the published comments proffered by Mr. Saidman, 375 who
bridges the academic/practical gap, very few established practitioners have
expressed their views on the instant issue in published formats. Notably, two
practitioners from a well-known all-IP firm provided a detailed written
analysis in connection with a major professional meeting just five years

370. Id. at 469. Similarly, in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), the Supreme Court has at
least implicitly recognized the possibility that the limits of one enumerated power can constrain another.
In that case, legislation enacted pursuant to the power to regulate the value of money was held to be
unconstitutional as it violated an inherent limitation on the power to borrow money on the credit of the
United States. See id. at 347.
371. Kalkwarf, supra note 101, at 411 (emphasis added). A similar view can be found in the Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), where the court began by considering whether the legislation was an
exercise of the commerce power or the taxation power. Finding that the real purpose behind the statute
was to regulate foreign commerce, the Court concluded that the law was not bound by the limits of the
Tax Clause. However, even though the Court concluded that the law was not enacted pursuant to the Tax
Clause, it nevertheless examined the challenged law in light of those limits, and concluded that it did
comport with them. The Court’s consideration of the question of whether a law enacted under the
Commerce Clause violated the Tax Clause’s requirement for uniformity strongly suggests that it
recognized that the limits of one Clause could restrict Congress’s power under another. Id. at 595-96.
372. 566 U.S. 639 (2012).
373. Id. at 645 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).
374. Id.
375. Saidman, supra note 65.
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ago. 376 While the authors correctly noted that TrafFix “did not discuss the
effect of an expired design patent on trade dress protection,” they also
commented – not so surely “correctly” in the current authors’ opinion—that
“TrafFix does not appear to have any effect on the prior case law relating to
trademark protection for a design that was protected by a design patent.” 377
They went on to cite positively E-Z Bowz, LLC v. Prof’l Prod. Research
Co., 378 which, in denying summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s
trade dress claims, considered the interaction of such claims with
coextensive design patent protections. The authors then commented as
follows:
In reaching its conclusion, the E-Z Bowz court specifically discussed the
effect of the existence of a design patent on a trade dress claim after the
TrafFix case and found that… a design patent not preclude trademark
protection in the same design…

However, the authors did not mention that E-Z Bowz made no reference
whatsoever to the Constitution. But to be fair to the authors, in the
conclusion to their article—a section perhaps pregnantly entitled “Still Not
Settled Precedent”—they candidly admitted the uncertainty still remaining,
in these particular terms:
But what about when the design patents . . . expire? Can the trademark
protection live on in perpetuity in its own right (assuming the trademark
continues to be used in commerce)? Although the law appears to be well
settled with respect to the availability of trademark protection despite the
existence of an expired design patent, the Supreme court has still not
expressly spoken to the issue and therefore, not all courts, nor the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may be of one mind. Thus, we may
still have to wait for the Supreme Court to address the issue in order to
know definitely if design patent and trade dress protection can peacefully
coexist and extend one beyond the other. 379

And in a final paragraph, they saliently said: “Until [the Supreme Court
speaks], intellectual property law practitioners should consider both design
patents and trade dress protection for the unique, non-functional aspects of
[their] client’s product configuration and packaging.” 380
The upshot of these views is that until the Supreme Court frontally faces
and decides this issue, practitioners should continue to do what they have
been doing (often without any forethought or reservations whatsoever) for
years, namely obtaining both types of protection (simultaneously or
sequentially). As a “practical” matter, this may be sound advice.381
376. T. Durkin and J. Shirk, Design Patents and Trade Dress Protection: Are the Two Mutually
Exclusive?, IPO Annual Meeting (Sept. 2016).
377. Id. at 9 (emphasis in the original).
378. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15364 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
379. Durkin, supra note 376, at 20.
380. Id.
381. Ms. Durkin was in attendance when the senior author of the current article professed the authors’
views about the unconstitutionality of double coverage in an AIPLA-sponsored debate with an established
patent practitioner from another all-IP firm about two years ago. See Kenneth Germain, “Why the
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XIII. WHY DON’T JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS ACKNOWLEDGE AND
EMBRACE THE CONFLICT?
As is typical, “proving” a negative or the absence of something is
difficult, maybe impossible. Surmising suppositions may be the best that
can be done sensibly. Thus, when attempting to ascertain why judges and/or
practitioners don’t “get” a particular legal theory or concept—or don’t even
seem to realize that such a theory or concept is lurking in the vicinity of the
issue(s) actually being considered—the challenge is substantial.
It’s easier to contemplate why judges might not “see” or deal with a
non-obvious issue: it’s not their jobs to probe below the surface of the issues
actually presented to them by counsel. And, not being IP-educated/oriented,
judges may assume or easily be persuaded into believing that various types
of IP (e.g., design patents and trademarks/trade dress), which emanate from
different statutes derived from different constitutional provisions, are so
different and separate that it would be normal for them to coexist
comfortably. Indeed, even when judges sense an underlying issue
potentially of consequence to deciding a litigated case, they may prefer to
refrain from being proactive as a matter of discrete jurisprudence. This is
especially likely when the underlying issue involves the Constitution; after
all, there is a generally recognized principle that the Constitution only should
be interpreted and applied when all non-constitutional grounds for decision
have been considered without resolving the case.382 And we, the authors of
this article, take no exception to this approach.
Perhaps this reluctance to parse the Constitution sometimes leads
judges to pursue—and find—ways to decide cases on grounds that are
somewhat questionable. A case in point is Bobrick v. ASI, discussed in the
Preface to this article. In that case, in the authors’ studied opinion—after
consulting with a bevy of patent lawyers all of whom were engineers before
they were lawyers—there was very doubtful reason for finding for
Defendant ASI (the close copyist, if you will) on the basis of utilitarian
functionality. 383 This is because the “convex arc” design in issue really did
not provide a mechanical or economical advantage to any maker of the
various stainless steel restroom accessories initially covered by Plaintiff’s
design patents and later covered by its trademark registrations. For example,
the load-bearing benefits of an arc are best realized when a weight is placed
Constitution Disallows Dual Protection Under Design Patent and Trade Dress Regimes for the Same
Subject Matter” AIPLA Design Rights Boot Camp (August 6, 2019). The debate opponent was Mr.
Richard Stockton, of Chicago’s Banner Witcoff firm. These same people re-debated about a year later.
See Kenneth Germain, “THE CONSTITUTION COMMANDETH: Thou Shall Not Protect the Same
Subject Matter Under Design Patent and Trade Dress Laws”, AIPLA Webinar Series (December 10,
2019).
382. See e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974) (explaining that a “court should not decide
federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”).
383. Bobrick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111465 (aff’d in part by Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v. Am.
Specialties, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5560 (9th Cir. Cal., Mar. 26, 2014)).
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on the apex of the arc (i.e., the highest point along the curved portion). But
here the convex arc was not load-bearing; rather, it merely served as a
decorative front for the washroom products. Nevertheless, utilitarian
functionality was the judge’s stated basis for Defendant’s victory. Aesthetic
functionality—also alleged in the case—based on the marketplace advantage
of the innovative, attractive contour of Plaintiff’s devices’ front panels,
would have been a much sounder rationale for rejecting Plaintiff’s
claims. But that doctrine was less well-settled and probably less familiar to
the judge. A victory for Defendant of course could have been based on the
absence of likelihood of confusion, especially considering the environment
of large, expensive commercial contracts involved. In truth, only if the judge
had rejected utilitarian (and aesthetic) functionality, and then proceeded to
find the existence of likelihood of confusion, would Plaintiff have been in
position to prevail, and only in that scenario would Defendant’s last-ditch
defense—unconstitutionality—have ascended to a must-decide level. Seen
this way, the judge’s recourse to utilitarian functionality is understandable
(even if not correct).
The bigger question is why practitioners—specifically those
representing defendants who would stand to benefit from the additional
defense of alleged unconstitutionality—apparently almost never have raised
let alone pressed this defense. Certainly, this defense would be last-ditch for
the reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, in recent decades there must have
been some cases in addition to Bobrick in which such a defense could have
been asserted—and even considered and cautiously ruled upon by some
judges. But no such cases have been found: only a few perfunctory
rulings… 384 So, the “blame” falls on the lawyers who represented relevant
defendants. Here’s our hypothesis: lawyers generally, but particularly those
practicing IP law (including patent law and trademark law) are protectionoriented. That is, their education, training, and mindset regarding IP issues
tends to be “how can we best protect our clients’ IP assets from being
infringed by their competitors?” IP lawyers sometimes represent defendants,
but they would be inclined to rely upon the more usual grounds for defense,
and, furthermore, consideration of the Constitution would not likely be on
their radar screens. Even if they conjured this up, they might be
uncomfortable in raising a theory that could be inconsistent with the proprotection preferences of many of their and/or their firms’ clients. And such
a defense would be seen as high-cost and low-success. So, why shoot the
golden goose?

384. See supra note 314.
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XIV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: THE “KEWANEE KOMPROMISE”*
Despite significant but superficial recognition among lower courts of
the simultaneous or sequential availability of multiple types of intellectual
property protection for the same nonfunctional product feature, the question
remains unresolved as to whether a conflict exists between providing trade
dress protection for a product design and the constitutional limits on patent
protection under the Patent Clause. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the
interaction between patent and trademark law is a key reason why this issue
remains unresolved, as is the fact that the precise issue has not been presented
to the Court as yet. The lack of any in-depth constitutional analysis of the
potential conflict by any of the lower courts that have addressed the issue
constitutes another reason why the issue remains unresolved.
Although not expressly identified as such, concerns with superfluity
might have been in the mind of the TrafFix Court. As discussed above, the
Court took the extra step of noting the lingering constitutional issue involved
with providing trade dress protection for previously-patented useful subject
matter.385 The Court’s obvious concern was with a situation in which trade
dress protection would be used to provide “the practical equivalent” of patent
protection. 386 The intuitive, albeit unstated, basis for this concern was that
providing patent-like protection for the previously-patented subject matter
through trade dress laws could render the Patent Clause—and its limits—
superfluous and therefore meaningless. This implicit basis is also reflected
in the Court’s opinion in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 387 in this
cautionary statement noting that a constitutional conflict would arise if a
particular law provided a viable means to protect inventions that was more
attractive than patent law:
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk
that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather
would rely on the state [trade secret] protection, we would be compelled
to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to exist. 388

As suggested herein, extending trade dress protection to the subject matter
of an expired design patent effectively provides “the practical equivalent” of
patent protection for the subject matter of the expired design patent. 389
*Kredit is given to Perry Saidman for his clever K-kontaining title, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan
Kopy Kats, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 839 (2000).
385. See supra note 207.
386. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.
387. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The Court further explained that, “[t]rade secret law and patent law have
co-existed in this country for over one hundred years.…Congress, by its silence over these many years,
has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress takes
affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets.”). Id. at 493.
388. Id. at 484. The authors recognize that the Kewanee Oil decision dealt with a conflict between
state trade secret law and federal patent law. Although relevant to the issue, the Supremacy Clause line
of cases does not directly dispose of the federal law vs. federal law conflict presented herein.
389. This is a result of the unique nature of product design trade dress. With most trademarks and
even product packaging trade dress, the mark is distinct from the goods offered under the mark. However,
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The concern with superfluity comes into sharpest focus in situations
where the holder of a design patent seeks to claim trade dress protection for
the patented design. Because the protections are largely equivalent, at least
as a practical matter, and because trade dress protection is not constrained by
the “for limited times” limitation of patent protection, patent holders would
naturally view trade dress protection as an attractive supplement to patent
protection. This attractiveness lies at the heart of the problem. Any
interpretation or implementation of the trade dress laws that provides such
limitless patent-like protection has the effect of rendering the Patent Clause
meaningless. Such a result would necessarily be unconstitutional.
Granting trade dress protection for a product design that previously was
the subject of a design patent plainly conflicts with the purposes of the Patent
Clause. The Supreme Court has emphasized, time and again, that a central
tenet underlying the patent system is that matter which falls into the public
domain must remain free for all to use. 390 Indeed, the language of and
limitations contained in the Patent Clause suggests that its purpose is to
protect and expand the public domain. 391 Hence, the Patent Clause envisions
a system where a product design is protected for a limited time, after which
it is injected into the public domain for all to use, free from restraint. 392
Granting trade dress protection for the product design effectively removes it
from the public domain. The conflict is obvious.
Of course, it is not merely the conflict with the purpose of the Patent
Clause that gives rise to unconstitutionality. It is the conflict combined with
the fact that product design trade dress can render the limitations of the
Patent Clause meaningless. A clear and significant limitation of the Patent
Clause is that any monopoly granted must be limited in time. Product design
trade dress protection, like all trademark protection, potentially can last
forever. Given that product design trade dress protection provides design
patent-like protection, it essentially can be used to perpetuate a monopoly
unrestrained by the “for limited times” limitation of the Patent Clause,
thereby rendering that limitation (if not the entire Patent Clause)
meaningless.

with product design trade dress, the mark is the product and the product is the mark. Protecting the mark
means preventing others from using the same product design, therefore effectively removing the design
of the product from the public domain for as long as the mark remains viable. As noted by one
commentator:
When a court is presented with a trade dress infringement for an existing or expired design
patent, it faces a perplexing obstacle. If the court grants an injunction for that which was
claimed in a design patent, i.e. the design, it would effectively be extending the term of the
patent beyond its statutory life…
Bonder, supra note 40, at 26. Mr. Bonder goes on to explain that such an extension of the patent is “a
result that should not occur.” Id. at 26-27.
390. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156; Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256.
391. See Perzanowski, supra note 330, at 1123-24.
392. Cf. generally Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 23.
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However, years ago the Supreme Court resolved a somewhat similar
overlap that existed between patent and trade secret law in a federal v. state
context. The resolution was simple: inventors of a novel technology may
choose between utility patent protection that provides them with exclusive
rights for a limited term in return for disclosing the technology, and trade
secret protection that provides potentially perpetual rights—as long as the
technology remains secret. In 1974, in Kewanee Oil, the Supreme Court held
that state trade secret protection was not in conflict with, and therefore not
pre-empted by, federal patent protection. 393 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court considered whether state trade secret protection conflicted with any of
three identified policies of federal patent law, looking particularly at whether
the state law clashed with the objectives of the federal law.394 The Court
concluded that the patent law policy of encouraging innovation is not
disturbed by the existence of trade secret protection, which also encourages
innovation. 395 The Court also concluded, following a considered analysis,
that trade secret law does not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure.396
In addition, the Court concluded that the policy of ensuring that matter in the
public domain remains free for all to use is not disturbed because trade
secrets, by their very nature, must be kept confidential and therefore have
never been placed in the public domain. 397
The Court’s analysis in Kewanee Oil is a purposive analysis. 398 It looks
to the purpose that each law is intended to serve and considers whether the
implementation of the purpose of the state law conflicts with the purpose
underlying the federal law. Ultimately, the Court found that the purposes are
not in conflict, but are complementary in that each encourages innovation.
As further support for its finding that the two purposes are in accord, the
Court noted that the protections afforded by trade secret law serve to

393. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
394. See id. at 480. As this case involved the interplay between federal and state law, the Court’s
conflict analysis was conducted in line with its Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 479.
395. See id. at 484.
396. See id. at 491. In conducting this analysis, the Court considered the potential for conflict
between the two protection schemes with respect to three different categories of trade secrets: those
believed by the owner to constitute a validly patentable invention; those known to their owners to be
ineligible for patent protection, and those whose valid patentability is considered dubious. See id. at 484.
After considering each of these types of trade secrets from a pragmatic point of view, the Court concluded
that the potential for trade secret protection to clash genuinely with the disclosure policy of patent
protection was, at best, remote, and that denying trade secret protection would have deleterious effects
on society. See id. at 485-91.
397. See id. at 484.
398. A purposive analysis dictates that a court interpreting a statute should attribute a purpose to the
statute, and then interpret the language to carry out the established purpose. See Michael Livingston,
Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 Tax L. Rev. 677, 680-81
(1996).
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encourage innovation largely in areas that would not otherwise be amenable
to patent protection, or for which patent protection is questionable. 399
However, that purposive analysis is conducted with a pragmatic
mindset. In finding that no significant conflict exists between the purposes
of patent law and trade secret law, the Court was plainly mindful of the
comparatively weaker protection afforded by trade secret law.400 Trade
secret protection, as the Court noted, is vulnerable to invalidation through
third party independent creation or discovery or through reverse engineering,
as well as through theft or misappropriation in a manner not easily
susceptible of proof. 401 Because of these vulnerabilities, trade secret law was
viewed more as a supplement to, and not a replacement for, patent protection,
serving to provide protection and encourage innovation in those instances
where patent protection would not be available. The language of the Court
strongly suggests that were the situation otherwise—that is, were trade secret
protection to be structured in such a way as to become an attractive
alternative to patent protection—the conflict analysis would have come out
differently:
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk
that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather
would rely on the state [trade secret] protection, we would be compelled
to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to exist. 402

Although not expressly stated as such by the Court, the decision in
Kewanee Oil forces inventors to make a choice regarding the type of
protection they wish for their inventions. They can elect to pursue patent
protection, or they can opt for trade secret protection. By the very nature of
these types of protection, however, they cannot have both. 403 Patents are
predicated on disclosure of the invention to public knowledge, whereas trade
secrets must be kept out of public knowledge or they cease to exist as secrets.
Hence, an inventor must make a clear choice early in the life of an invention
which type of protection will best protect his interests. Some commentators
have indicated that forcing a similar choice between design patent protection
and product design trade dress protection could avoid any conflict between
the Patent Clause and trade dress law. 404
399. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493 (explaining that “[t]rade secret law encourages the
development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded
protection under the patent laws”.).
400. See id. at 489-90.
401. See id. at 490.
402. Id. at 489.
403. See. e.g., Bone supra note 13, at 265 n.105 (identifying the two types of protection as mutually
exclusive).
404. See, e.g., Horlander, 97 Trademark Rep. at 757 (“Inventors should be required to elect between
(1) the time-limited statutory monopoly of a patent, or (2) the rigors of the marketplace race to obtain
acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning) in a product configuration trade dress and the ultimate
reward of a potentially limitless time period of product configuration trade dress protection.”); see also
Browning, supra note 208, at 1064 (suggesting that a trade dress claim involving a product design that
was the subject of an expired design patent would fail “because upon the expiration of the producer’s
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The choice between protection by design patent or protection by trade
dress may be analogous to the choice between protection by utility patent or
trade secret. In this regard, the relationship between design patent and trade
dress is similar to the relationship between utility patent and trade secret. For
example, once the developer of a product design chooses trade dress to
protect its design, it cannot seek design patent protection because the product
design is necessarily used in public. 405 However, because trade dress law
cannot protect product design before acquiring secondary meaning, per WalMart, there is a risk that competitors will copy the design early on.
Alternatively, the developer of a product design could choose patent
protection before publicly disclosing the design. The scope of protection
offered through design patent is generally broader than that of trade dress. 406
Comparatively speaking, because utility patent and trade secret are
alternative means to protect technologies, so too should design patent and
trade dress be alternative means to protect product design. In this manner,
the creator of a product design should be limited to only one means of
protection. Accordingly, applying the same principles in the relationship
between utility patent and trade secret, the creators of product designs could
not invoke trade dress protection once they choose design patent protection,
or vice versa. Thus, by analogy to the Kewanee Kompromise, the
constitutional conflict is defused. A recent article reached the same
conclusion:
Thus, an analysis of the laws involving design patents and trademarks
establish[es] that the holder of a design must be an adult and make a
choice. The owner cannot have both a design patent and a trademark for
the same design. It is constitutionally prohibited by the Patent/Copyright
Clause. The owner of the design must decide whether an exclusive
monopoly over the design for fourteen years with the design belonging to
the public after the expiration of the monopoly would be better than using
the design as a trademark and possessing the design forever, possibly
developing the trademark into the owner’s most valuable commodity. The
one thing the owner may never have is both a design patent and a
trademark for the same design. 407

Another author also took on the issue frontally, concluding, after careful
analysis, that design patents and trade dress on the same design cannot
constitutionally coexist. 408 So said he:
design patent, which the producer elected to secure, the federal patent laws gave rise to a federal right to
‘copy and to use’ the claimed ornamental features of the device.”(emphasis in original)).
405. The primary law controlling statutory bars is 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), stating “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States.”
406. Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 637 (“Compared to patent protection, trademark protection is relatively
weak because it precludes competitors only from using marks that are likely to confuse or deceive the
public.”).
407. Kalkwarf, supra note 101, at 425-26 (emphasis added).
408. See Tyler Jackson, Functional Signs and Decanters of Wine: How Trade Dress Protection
Unconstitutionally Extends Expired Design Patents, 18 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 431, 450-51 (2014).

2022

THE CONSTITUTION COMMANDETH

157

The extension of design patent protection though [sic] trade dress
protection unconstitutionally interferes with the right to copy guaranteed
by the Constitution… While the rule in Sears was based on the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, the logic still applies. … The Court reasoned
that “the patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are
carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition.” … While the Supremacy Clause cannot be used to
invalidate federal laws, the Constitution binds federal courts and
Congress. Therefore, the creation of trade dress law through legislation
and common law must comport with the Constitution, including the Patent
Clause. 409

Yet another commentator proposed amending design patent statutory law to
include a short period in which design patent owners are required to convert
to trade dress protection. 410 He further explained:
With regard to trade dress protection after a design patent expires when
the design patent owners did not switch the design patent to trade dress…
no one can invoke trade dress protection for the design disclosed in
expired patents. Because the design patent owners chose the protection by
design patent although they had a chance to choose the protection by trade
dress, they accepted the risk that their product design might not be
protected even if it acquired secondary meaning later. They should assume
the risk because they decided not to pursue trade dress protection initially.
In addition, exclusion of trade dress protection after design patents expire
may practically impose little problems on the industrial design world since
the life of industrial design may not be so long as the life of design
patents. 411

XV. CONCLUSION
The American pro-competition, anti-protectionist environment—as
evidenced by the general nature of “unfair competition” laws and also by
statutory enactments such as Sherman, Clayton, and the FTC Act—has been
confirmed many times and for many years by Supreme Court precedents
consistently taking “right to copy” positions that are intended to leave in the

409. Id. at 451. He took the preemption principle a significant step further, and beyond the scope of
the Kewanee Kompromise, stating, “[t]he right to use a design should also apply to designs that are
unpatented but otherwise patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 171 as a design patent.” Id. Thus, in his view,
design patent availability would preclude trade dress protection. The current authors do not subscribe to
this radical view.
410. Saito explained these proposed amendments to the design patent laws as follows:
Creators of novel product design may seek design patent protection regardless of actual use of
the design. If the requirements for design patent are met, the design patent is granted. Next,
within a limited time, i.e. a statutory period, the design patent owners may choose between
keeping design patent protection without change or switching subsequently to trade dress
protection… If they decide to switch to trade dress protection from design patent protection,
they would file a trade dress application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) within the statutory period. When the application is registered, the design patent will
expire. If the USPTO finally rejects the application, the design patent remains valid.
Saito, supra note 204, at 690. Saito further explained how this would be a proper approach to protect
product design that is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, without betraying public
expectation for practicing the subject matter in expiring design patents. Id.
411. Id. at 691.
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public domain everything that cannot justifiably be singled out for
protection, or where prior protections have expired.
In a few contexts other than the current one, the Constitution has been
construed so that its arguably inconsistent provisions can coexist
harmoniously. Principles of sound constitutional (and analogous statutory)
interpretation have been applied so as to provide preference and deference—
with regard to specific requirements and restrictions viewed in
contradistinction to amorphous general authorizations. Accordingly, the
specific has prevailed over the general, and nothing has been rendered
superfluous and void. In the current context, then, the Patent Clause, with
its specific, express requirements and restrictions, should prevail over
inconsistent applications of the Commerce Clause, with its judiciallyexpanded, general and loose scope.
When the two Clauses overlap in such a way that one might “overrule”
the other, the specific must not be defeated by the general. In such a
situation, the authors of this article propose that the owner of the relevant
IP—specifically the owner of a design that is amenable to protection both
under Design Patent law and under Trademark/Trade Dress law—be legally
required to choose one of these modes, foregoing the other completely. This
is what the authors have dubbed the “Kewanee Kompromise.”

